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Contesting Gender in Popular Culture and
Family Law: Middlesex and Other Transgender
Tales
SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON*
I. CAL AND His COHORT
They're everywhere: transsexuals, intersexed individuals, and others of uncertain
gender classification. Transgender issues have come out of the closet as popular culture
seems to have discovered a new favorite. Recently, several successful books and
movies, not to mention frequent television coverage on both talk shows and science
programs, have introduced the public to numerous ordinary people whose very
existence challenges the notion that sex and gender provide life's fundamental
organizing principles. In turn, the law's reliance on strict sex-based categories becomes
increasingly fragile, indeed too fragile to withstand challenges to marriage laws
requiring a male and a female.
One of the most prominent pop-culture examples these days is Cal, formerly
Calliope ("Callie"), Stephanides, the protagonist of Jeffrey Eugenides's Pulitzer-Prize-
winning novel Middlesex.' Several reviews emphasize the theme of transformation in
the story told by this delightful and sympathetic narrator,2 who "was born twice: first,
as a baby girl ... and then again, as a teenage boy."3 This theme of transformation
might explain why Eugenides decided on a protagonist with 5-alpha-reductase
deficiency syndrome because such male "pseudohermaphrodites" appear female at
birth and through childhood, only to experience at puberty the masculinization
belatedly triggered by their XY chromosomes.4 In Cal's case, the condition comes
* Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe Couzins Professor of Law, Washington University in St.
Louis. With the customary disclaimers about their responsibility for errors, the author thanks
Martha Chamallas, Barbara Flagg, Henna Hill Kay, Laura Rosenbury, Nancy Staudt, Holly
Stone, and Mimi Wesson for their thoughtful comments and Brandy Anderson and Kimberly
Busch for their careful research assistance.
1. JEFFREY EUGENIDES, MIDDLESEX (2002).
2. See, e.g., Bill Goldstein, A Novelist Goes Far Afield but Winds Up Back Home
Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2003, at E1 (describing Middlesex as "a novel of metamorphoses and
transformations"); Julie Wheelwright, Books: Across the Great Divide; Gender Confusion and
Greek Tragedy Have Bred an American Epic, THE INDEPENDENT (LoNDON), Oct. 19, 2002, at
41 ("Eugenides... brilliantly weaves together strands of genetic heritage, mistaken identity and
transformation .... ) (book review), available at LEXIS, News Library, Indpnt File.
3. Eugenides, supra note 1, at 3.
4. People with 5-ARD [5-alpha-reductase deficiency] are ...
chromosomally and gonadally male, but have genitals that may
be ambiguous or more female than male in appearance until
puberty. Due to a lack of the enzyme 5-alpha-reductase, these
children cannot convert their body's normal production of
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from a recessive gene that he traces to his grandparents; as a result, for young Callie
adolescence unexpectedly brings facial hair, a muscular body, an emerging penis (her
"crocus," which "blooms" 5), as well as a growing attraction to a classmate at her all
girls' school.
Cal narrates a riveting story. Despite an occasional caricature, many of those
populating the book, including his ancestors, come to life, thanks to Eugenides's
thoughtful portrayals and attention to details, as recalled by Cal. The epic tale, which
pays dutiful homage to the classics, demonstrates an evocative sense of place (or
places): from war-ravaged Smyrna in 1922, to Detroit from the Prohibition era until
after the ghetto upheavals of the 1960s, to private-school suburbia in the late 1960s,
with brief visits to the seamy side of San Francisco in the mid-1970s and then to
contemporary Berlin. Although the story has many hallmarks of a Greek tragedy, the
protagonist meets a bittersweet, rather than a disastrous, end.6
Yet for purposes of this essay, more significant than the transformation theme, the
classical allusions, and the historical meanderings is the simple fact that Cal, like
Calliope before him, emerges as an enormously engaging figure about whom the reader
cannot help but care. Given his unusual sexual circumstances, what effect does this
protagonist with such a winning personality have on our understanding of sex and
gender and, in turn, the way the law approaches these categories?
In addressing this question, this essay explores two primary threads. First, this essay
examines what Cal's fictional and lighthearted story adds to the true, tragic story of
David Reimer, a notorious "test case" in the nature/nurture debate about gender.7
Second, this essay considers what Cal and the other transgendered figures in popular
culture contribute to the ongoing public conversation about legal sex-based
classifications, particularly the male-female requirement for marriage. In addition to
exposing several overlooked nuances in David Reimer's history (all with significance
for the law), the lens of Middlesex reveals the continuing erosion of our traditional
understanding of sex and gender. Popular culture has reinforced contemporaneous
legal developments, bringing prevailing prohibitions against same-sex marriage to the
brink of collapse.
testosterone into dihydrotestosterone ("DHT"'), a process which
is necessary for the development of male genitalia .... [Wlith
the production of more testosterone at puberty, children with 5-
ARD will develop secondary sex characteristics standard for
men, including facial hair, muscularization of the body, and
deepening of the voice, despite the continued low levels of
DHT. That is, they go from looking outwardly female to looking
outwardly male. Often, their testicles will voluntarily descend
and the small phallus will increase in size enough to be
considered a small penis.
SHARON E. PREVES, INTERSEX AND IDENTITY: THE CONTESTED SELF 29 (2003).
5. EUGENIDES, supra note 1, at 376, 386-88.
6. A tragedy usually features "a fatal or disastrous conclusion." THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO ENGUSH LITERATURE 1023 (Margaret Drabble ed., 6th ed. 2000).
7. See David Reimer, 38, Subject of the John/Joan Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2004, at
A21 (obituary). For a more extensive introduction of David Reimer, see infra notes 22-33 and
accompanying text.
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Certainly, I am not the first observer to remark on the recent efflorescence of
transgendered8 characters in popular culture.9 Moreover, like Eugenides, I am an
appropriate target for criticism because I am writing about transgender issues without
meeting face-to-face with a person who could tell me about such lived experience.'
Yet for this reason, my perspective should come closest to the mainstream view that I
want to emphasize here-the view of those members of the general public who have
recently encountered this world through books, movies, theater, and the media.
Although feminist scholars and queer theorists have had much to tell their colleagues
about the artificiality of traditional gender categories," the "mainstreaming" of
transgendered characters also deserves analysis.
A Who's Who of such characters would no doubt include, in addition to Cal
Stephanides, Dana, the male-to-female transsexual at the center of Chris Bohjalian's
sweet romantic novel, Trans-Sister Radio, published in 2000, and Brandon Teena, the
anatomical male living as a female, whose portrayal in Boys Don't Cry won Hilary
Swank a 2000 Academy Award.' 2 It might also include Calpernia Addams (a male-to-
female transsexual whose male lover was killed in a well-publicized act of anti-gay
violence in the military),13 Cheryl Chase (the often televised former director of the
8. On the use of terminology, including "male," "female," "sex," "gender,"
"transgendered," "transsexual," and "intersexed," see infra Part III.A. 1.
9. See, e.g., J. MIcHAEL BAILEY, TiE MAN WHO WOULD BE QuEEN: THE SCIENCE OF
GENDER-BENDING AND TRANSSEXUALISM 143 (2003) ("Transsexuals are hot."); Sharon Doyle
Driedger, Gender Paradoxes, MACLEAN'S, May 26, 2003, at 33 (cover story); Nazila Fathi, As
Repression Eases, More Iranians Change Their Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at A3; John
Jurgensen, Born Ambiguous: Exploring the Phenomenon of People Born with Genitalia Not
Easily Categorized as 'Male'or 'Female,' HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 6, 2002, at D1; Mireya
Navarro, When Gender Isn't a Given, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, §9, at 1; Dinitia Smith, On
Being Male, Female, Neither or Both, N.Y. TvEs, Oct. 29, 2002, at F5; see also Susan Frelich
Appleton, Gender Contests, J. GENDER-SPECIFIC MED., Sept./Oct. 2002, at 11; Barron H. Lerner,
M.D., If Biology Is Destiny, When Shouldn't It Be?, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2003, at F6; Simon J.
Nadel, When Harry Becomes Sally: Transgender Issues Increasingly Confront Employers, 70
U.S. L. WK. 2379 (2002).
10. See Jurgensen, supra note 9 (quoting Thea Hillman, who "took issue with portions
of Eugenides' novel because 'by using a person with intersex as a literary tool without ever
talking to one, he's not doing anything different than the doctors who use people with intersex
as case studies"'). By contrast, consider Sharon Preves's book, based on interviews of thirty-
seven intersexed adults, and Pat Cain's thoughtful use of narratives from female-to-male
transsexuals, among others. PREVES, supra note 4, at 8; Patricia A. Cain, Stories from the
Gender Garden: Transsexuals andAnti-Discrimination Law, 75 DENv. U. L. REv. 1321, 1336-
51(1998).
11. See, e.g., ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE
CONSTRUCTON OF SEXUALITY (2000); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys:
Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex, " "Gender, " and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-
American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1995).
12. See, e.g., Rick Lyman, 'American Beauty' Tops the Oscars: Main Acting Awards
Go to Kevin Spacey and Hilary Swank, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 2000, at El.
13. David France, An Inconvenient Woman, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,2000, § 6 (Magazine),
at 24. See also Margo Jefferson, Just an Ordinary Guy Finds Unordinary Love, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31, 2003, at B16 (reviewing a television movie about the case); Slain Gay Soldier's Case
Slows a General's Rise, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2003, § 1, at 32.
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ISNA, the Intersex Society of North America), 14 and several children and young adults
whose stories of gender defiance have made their way into the popular press." In 2003,
nonfiction fans got to know novelist and English professor Jennifer Finney Boylan
while curling up with her memoir about her sex change, She's Not There: A Life in Two
Genders; more passive couch potatoes met a midwestern husband who had surgery to
become a woman in Normal, an HBO film starring Jessica Lange and Tom
Wilkinson. 16 In 2004, the Pulitzer-Prize-winning drama I Am My Own Wife introduced
New York theatergoers to an East German transvestite; publicity about the play
widened when it received Tony awards for best play and best actor.
17
Does such attention to transgender issues really represent something new? I do
recall during my childhood popular preoccupation with the case of male-to-female
transsexual soldier Christine Jorgensen (whose 1952 sex-reassignment surgery,
featured in Life Magazine, was reportedly the first publicly discussed) and later with
physician and tennis player Renee Richards (in the mid-1970s). Similarly, I remember
Diane Arbus's haunting photographs of hermaphrodites (published posthumously in
1972), perhaps my first introduction to intersexed individuals (which, in retrospect,
unmasked my sorely incomplete exposure to the classics18). Yet these figures gained
prominence as part of a cultural scene that presented them as fascinatingly deviant.
Jorgensen's and Richards's stories emerged as bizarre and shocking precursors to the
sensationalism that became commonplace on television shows such as Jerry Springer. 
19
Similarly, Arbus's hermaphrodites form part of a photography collection that also
14. See, e.g., Is It a Boy or a Girl? (Discovery Channel television broadcast, March
2000).
15. These include little Patrick Harmon-Smith, an intersexed child whose parents tried
mightily to resist "normalizing" (feminizing) surgery only to learn that a physician had duped
them when they consented to a biopsy of his undescended testicle. See Gender Unknown
(Discovery Health Channel television broadcast, Jan. 2001); Sally Lehrman, Sex Police,
SALON.cOM, at http://www.salon.com/health/feature/1999/04/05/sex police (Apr. 5, 1999).
Other candidates for this list include a middle-school girl "passing" as a boy (see Benoit
Denizet-Lewis, About a Boy Who Isn 't, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,2002, §6 (Magazine), at 30) and a
female student whose preference for male attire prompted her to sue her local school board to
overturn a yearbook-photo dress code requiring off-the-shoulder drapes for girls and coats and
ties for boys (see Fox on the Record with Greta Van Susteren (Fox television broadcast, June
20, 2002)). See also Fred A. Bernstein, On Campus, Rethinking Biology 101, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
7, 2004, § 9, at 1 (depicting several openly transgendered college students).
16. See Emily Nussbaum, When an Ex-Man Loves a Woman, N.Y. TIMES, March 16,
2003, §2, at 38 (film review).
17 Jesse McKinley, Puppet Musical Wins Big, as Does 'My Own Wife', N.Y. TIMES,
June 7, 2004, at E3.
18. I refer here to the ancient Greek myth about Hermaphroditos, son of Hermes and
Aphrodite, who became joined in one body with a nymph.
19. A quite favorable review of the opera inspired by the Jerry Springer show supports
this generalization. See Caryn James, Now in London: I Was Jilted by a Lesbian Dwarfl, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2003, § 2, at 7 (the opera "embraces the Springer carnival of freaks even while
sending it up").
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includes other "freaks," from identical twins and giants to adults with Down
syndrome.
0
By contrast, with Cal and the others in today's cohort, their down-to-earth humanity,
their emotional normality, and their tugs on our empathy all stand out to evoke quite
different reactions than their cultural predecessors. Still, the response might well
remain "so what?"-we now live in a different era, after both the sexual revolution and
the coming of age of civil rights. 2' It should come as no surprise that today's portrayals
and attitudes about transgendered people are more positive and less judgmental than
before. Yet, that's just the point; legal change is a dynamic process that takes place in a
larger social context. As one sample of modern popular culture, Cal's story elucidates
contemporaneous developments in the law and invites thought experiments about the
forks in the road that lie ahead.
II. TRANSMONING TO MIDDLESEX
The path from Christine Jorgensen and Jerry Springer does not lead directly to Cal
and his contemporaries, however. An important transitional object along the way
toward present attitudes and sensibilities is the story (or, more accurately, the stories)
of the man we came to know as David Reimer. In fact, one can easily see in Middlesex
echoes of what we have learned about David Reimer-depicted, however, in a softer,
more equivocal, and ultimately more instructive light.
The first version of David's story appeared in 1972 in the scientific publications of
Dr. John Money. Money's famous papers claimed to establish "nurture," as
distinguished from "nature," as the basis of gender by detailing how a baby boy
(originally named Bruce Reimer), who lost his penis as the result of a circumcision
mishap, was successfully reared as a girl. 22 Following Money's expert advice, the
devastated parents had the child's testicles surgically removed, tried their best to treat
the child (renamed Brenda) as a daughter, and kept this medical history a closely held
secret, because Money had explicitly warned that any breach would compromise their
child's "cure." For his part, Money took full advantage of the fact that the child had an
identical twin brother (Brian Reimer)-a feature that gave the case the trappings of a
legitimate scientific experiment, specifically a "control group. '23 According to
Money's reports, the sex reassignment produced a happy, healthy daughter who would
need only a little help from hormonal treatments and genital surgery as she became
older.
20. See, e.g., Arthur Lubow, Arbus Reconsidered, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, § 6
(Magazine), at 28, 31 ("Without sentimentalizing them or ignoring their failings, she liked and
admired her freaks.").
21. This generalization now includes some gay rights. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker v.
State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
22. JOHN MONEY & ANKE A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, Boy & GIRL 118-23 (1972);
see also JOHN COLAPrNTo, As NATURE MADE HIM: THE Boy WHO WAS RAISED AS A GIRL 33-34
(2000) (quoting an unspecified 1955 work of Money).
23. See CoLAPmrTo, supra note 22, at 67-69; FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 66-
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Although we later learned that there was something dreadfully wrong with this
picture, Dr. Money's version of the story acquired a life of its own. Medical protocols
for intersexed children relied on Money's theory of "gender plasticity."2 4 Scholarly
analyses in many different fields presented gender as entirely a social construct. 5 For
example, in family law, a law school course I have taught for almost thirty years, three
different editions of one of the leading casebooks included an excerpt from John
Money and Anke Ehrhardt's report to invite discussion of marriage laws that require
one male and one female.2 6 What is the purpose of such requirements if anyone can be
a male or female with appropriate medical assistance and social support, as Money's
study suggested?
David Reimer went public with a very different version of the story in 2000,
primarily through the publication of John Colapinto's As Nature Made Him: The Boy
Who Was Raised as a Girl and through David's own television appearances as well.
David claimed that, as Brenda, he had had an utterly miserable childhood.27 He felt he
never fit in, 28 and responding to others' gendered expectations of him only intensified
his alienation.29 His despair peaked as he approached adolescence, ultimately forcing
his parents to renege on their commitment to secrecy. Contrary to Money's warnings,
David found the revelation that he had been born a male a welcome relief because it
provided an irresistibly simple explanation for his overwhelming distress.30 At age
fourteen, he resumed a male identity, took the name David, and began a life that later
included marriage and fatherhood of his wife's three children, whom he adopted. Then,
in 2004, David's story abruptly and tragically ended with his suicide; according to his
obituary, his mother attributes David's death to Money's experiment.
31
At first glance, the moral of the tragic version of David's story makes nature
triumphant and gender inalterably hard-wired. Certainly, Colapinto's book presents
24. SuzANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXED 7 (1998). On how Money's
work influenced the development of the medical standard, see id. at 15-16; COLAPItro, supra
note 22, at 75-76; PREvEs, supra note 4, at 52-54.
25. See CoLAPINTo, supra note 22, at 69-70. But see KESSLER, supra note 24, at 7
(critiquing Money's theory for "putting so much emphasis on the genitals as evidence of
gender"); id. at 25 (detailing Money's reliance on genital measurements for sex-assignment
decisions). Indeed, Money's own work emphasizes biological or "natural" influences, including
prenatal exposure to hormones. See MONEY & EHRHARDT, supra note 22, at 98-103 (reporting
"masculinized" behavior of "fetally-androgenized, genetic females").
26. See JuDrrH AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 30-33 (1978); id. at 24-
26 (2d ed. 1985); id. at 30-33 (3d ed. 1992). But see id. at 46 (4th ed. 1999) (reporting more
recent evidence showing failure of Money's approach in Reimer's case).
27. COLAPINTO, supra note 22, at xii-xiii.
28. See id. at 60-62, 148.
29. Id. at 101-02, 107, 122-23, 145; see also id. at 190 (discussing young David's
attraction to females).
30. Id. at 180. For a much earlier case, from 1888, in which "mistaken" female sexual
assignment reportedly resulted in truancy, disobedience, and "moral perversion" (all signs "of
the true sex trying to overcome the 'torture' of a mistaken sex"), see ALICE DOMURAT DREGER,
HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX 76-78 (1998).
31. See David Reimer, 38, Subject of the John/Joan Case, supra note 7, at A2 1; see also
Elaine Woo, David Reimer, 38; After Botched Surgery, He Was Raised as a Girl in Gender
Experiment, L.A. TIMEs, May 13, 2004, at B12.
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David's experience as a decisive refutation of Money's theory that culture and
environment determine gender.32 Whatever rethinking of gender that Money's work
had sparked in fields ranging from pediatric medicine to feminist theory to family law,
Colapinto dismisses such developments as errors resting on false foundations. And
certainly, it would be easy to see David's suicide as reinforcement of Colapinto's
conclusions about the harm of those years spent in the "wrong gender."
33
Yet to take home from David's history only the message that "nature rules" requires
overlooking other important elements and the issues that they raise-including the
impact of family secrets, the limits of parental autonomy, and parents' frequent need to
rely on experts. When Middlesex revisits each of these elements, it softens and removes
much of the sting that David experienced. By diminishing the harshness of David's
story while preserving some of its central ingredients, Cal's chronicle brings to light
complexities that the shocking headlines about David Reimer have obscured.
A. The Burden of a Family Secret
First, without minimizing poor David's childhood agonies, one can raise questions
about the cause.34 Certainly, he lived with parents burdened by a terrible secret. This
secret, with the deep guilt that lingered after the circumcision accident, must have cast
an inescapable pall over every aspect of the family relationship. Imagine how the
Reimer parents must have felt knowing what they knew, and yet feeling bound not to
tell their child, whose successful "treatment" depended on their secrecy. Some of the
recent literature about the benefits of open adoption at least suggests that secrecy itself
can cause psychological damage to children.35 Yet Colapinto's single-minded emphasis
on a childhood spent in the "wrong gender" has removed from the afterlife of David's
story questions about the role that secrecy might well have played.
Cal, too, is the heir of an unusual family secret. His paternal grandmother and
grandfather were sister and brother, passionately attracted to one another. They
refashioned themselves as young lovers and married at sea during a harrowing flight to
America, where they could make a fresh start-with no one aware of their preexisting
connection. They had qualms about their relationship, but no knowledge of the
recessive gene their union would vitalize.
32. See COLAPINTo, supra note 22, at xiv; see also PREVES, supra note 4, at 97. But see
JUDrrH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 64-69 (2004) (examining David's story as paradox and
allegory).
33. See also infra note 85 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulty of
identifying the "cause" of David's suicide).
34. A few alternative explanations have been advanced. See BAILEY, supra note 9, at 46
(speculating that, at seventeen months, Brenda might have been too old for successful
reassignment); KESSLER, supra note 24, at 6-7 (suggesting ambivalent parents might have given
Brenda mixed messages); see also COLAPNTO, supra note 22, at 250 (reporting that Money
leaked rumors about parents' inability to accept child as a daughter, thus unconsciously
undermining reassignment).
35. See, e.g., Annette Baran & Reuben Pannor, Open Adoption, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
ADOPTION 316, 318 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds., 1990); Marianne
Berry, Risks and Benefits of Open Adoption, 3 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 125, 127-28 (Spring
1993).
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Cal, the narrator, knows all these facts from the opening pages of Middlesex. Young
Callie and the others in the replayed family history do not, however. (Of course, the
grandparents themselves know their romance is incestuous, and they periodically
experience shame, fright, regret, and guilt about it.) Although Callie's grandparents
occupy an important position in her young life, their secret is about them, and not at all
about her. Because even her parents are not aware of the secret, the shadow cast on
Callie's family relationship lacks the directness and intensity we find in David's case.
When Cal, the adult, describes a happy childhood, despite being reared in the "wrong
gender," perhaps the different place of secrets in the Reimer and Stephanides families
accounts for the contrasting retrospectives.
By creating a secret once removed, Eugenides offers a "kinder, gentler" version of a
key element of David's story, while allowing plenty of room to confront the questions
that this fact evokes: what sorts of secrets can members of well-functioning families
have? When does a child's need for healthy, emotional growth compel parents (and
grandparents) to share information with him or her? Are long-term secrets about a child
always misguided, or can they ever be justified as serving the child's own well-being?
Consider here the traditional way of dealing with some intersexed children,
especially those with androgen insensitivity syndrome ("AIS"). These are
chromosomal males who appear female and generally are reared as such.36 Indeed, at
puberty they typically develop what the literature refers to as "voluptuous female
figure[s]., 3 7 The conventional wisdom has been not to share with the patient the results
of chromosomal tests usually performed at adolescence to determine the cause for the
absence of menstruation. 38 In fact, I recall the comments of a physician not long ago
during an academic discussion of paternalism versus informed consent; he mentioned
such AIS cases as the sole situation he knew in which, today, doctors routinely do not
provide full information to their patients. 39 Intersex activists have now challenged this
practice because of the harm that they claim it inflicts.
40
36. AIS children have an X and an Y chromosome and active
testes, but because their cells are insensitive to testosterone,
they cannot develop masculine secondary sex characteristics
and often respond at puberty to their own testicular estrogen by
developing a voluptuous female figure. Such children are
generally raised as girls, both because of their feminine body
structure and because past experience has shown that AIS
children usually develop a female gender identity. Often the
AIS child's testes are removed ....
FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 64.
37. Id. Dreger reports the story of and includes a photograph of a Parisian model with
,MS (an attractive female). DREGER, supra note 30, at 130-32.
38. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 64-65; Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton
Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma: Should Physicians Perform Sex
Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 50-55
(2000); Navarro, supra note 9, at 1; see also Ann Cote, Telling the Truth: Therapeutic Privilege
and Intersexuality in Children, 8 HEALTH L.J. 199, 203-08 (2000) (questioning application of
"therapeutic privilege" as justification for nondisclosure in such cases).
39. Beyond these secrets, do secrets with genetic consequences for future generations
belong in a class by themselves, in which the right to know always trumps privacy concerns?
Suppose Cal's grandparents knew of the recessive gene they carried? On the other hand, what of
[Vol. 80:391
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David's story, as illuminated by Cal's, suggests that openness, no less than "nature,"
should guide how families and physicians respond to young persons in their care.
B. Parental Autonomy Gone Awry
David's own version of his story also sounds a cautionary note about the limits of
parents' ability to mold their children-a lesson that reaches well beyond the divide
that gender is thought to create. No matter how hard they tried to follow Money's
childrearing directives, the Reimers could not make their child into "Brenda."
In Middlesex, this theme plays out at two levels. First, Cal's very existence
embodies parental wish fulfillment, haunted by guilt. His parents not only dreamed of a
daughter but had the audacity to "mess with Mother Nature" in a studied effort to
create one. Following a purportedly scientific method of determining offspring's sex
based on the timing of intercourse during the woman's ovulatory cycle, Cal's parents
tampered with one of the mysteries of life.4' When the parents appeared to get just
what they had wanted, a baby girl, they were oblivious to the fateful consequences of
their choice. Any of an infinite number of variations would have produced a different
child, quite probably without the 5-alpha-reductase deficiency syndrome that forms the
centerpiece of Cal's story and that came from the joinder of an egg and a particular
sperm each with the same familial mutation tracing back to a tiny Greek village.42
a family member's right not to know such information? See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Boom in Gene
Testing Raises Questions on Sharing Results, N.Y. TIMEs, July 21, 2000, at Al; see also Pate v.
Threlkel, 661 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla. 1995) (holding that a physician has a duty to tell patient
about risk to patient's offspring).
40. On the importance of physicians' openness with their intersexed patients, see
FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 85 and PREVES, supra note 4, at 108-09. See also DREGER,
supra note 30, at 190-92 (noting patients' objections to secrecy).
41. It was the father's idea, but the mother acquiesced, although with misgivings. See
EUGENIDES, supra note 1, at 8.
42. As Cal narrates, after the fact, the story of his own conception:
The timing of the thing had to be just so in order for me to become the person I
am. Delay the act by an hour and you change the gene selection....
... Inside my mother, a billion sperm swim upstream, males in the lead. They
carry not only instructions about eye color, height, nose shape, enzyme
production, microphage resistance, but a story, too. Against a black background
they swim, a long white silken thread spinning itself out. The thread began on a
day two hundred and fifty years ago, when the biology gods, for their own
amusement, monkeyed with a gene on a baby's fifth chromosome .... [Now] the
biology gods knew this was their time, this was what they'd been waiting for, and
... my destiny fell into place .... [E]verything was in place, the roller coaster
was in free fall and there was no stopping it now, my father was seeing visions of
little girls and my mother was praying to a Christ Pantocrater she didn't entirely
believe in, until finally-right this minute!-on Greek Easter, 1959, it's about to
happen. The gene is about to meet its twin.
As sperm meets egg, I feel a jolt.
Id. at 11,210-11.
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Second, near the end of Middlesex, when the parents finally seek medical help
because of Callie's failure to menstruate and other unexpected difficulties, they clearly
want to follow the recommendations necessary for their daughter to remain a daughter.
Without fully grasping that Callie is, in fact, biologically male, they seem ready and
willing to choose her destiny, and they expect her to follow compliantly. Instead, Callie
escapes in order to make the transition to a male identity.
Thus on both levels, we again have in Middlesex David's story but without such a
brutal edge. Through their self-consciously timed conception, Cal's parents tried to
fashion the child they wanted. Their efforts were fleeting; those of David's parents
were sustained. For Cal's parents, the child did not yet exist, so the terrible battle of
wills one envisions within David's family, as the parents tried to create a daughter
pursuant to Dr. Money's prescription, is-to the reader's relief-missing from Cal's
story. Then, before the efforts to force continued "daughterhood" on an unwilling son
reach full tilt, Cal (now a resourceful adolescent) leaves to chart his own course.
Freed from the oppressive weight of David's suffering, a narrative about parental
efforts to create the child of their choice necessarily calls attention to the tension
parents and our expectations of parents evoke every day. The overarching question,
revealed by Cal's tale, asks: to what extent do we expect parents (especially mothers)
to be self-sacrificing-to subordinate their own wishes and preferences? A closer look
at the determination of Cal's parents to conceive a daughter raises more pointed
questions: as the increasing popularity of assisted reproductive technologies reveals,
don't people always have children to satisfy their own needs, because the notion of
having a child for the sake of the child is incoherent? As these technologies give
parents more control over the characteristics of their children, including sex,43 will
such families pay a price in unintended consequences or as "punishment" for
exercising a power that ought to reside elsewhere? 44 Once we squarely recognize
procreation as parental wish fulfillment, what are its limits?45
43. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Getting the Girl, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1999, § 6 (Magazine),
at 26 (examining parental use and ambivalence about sperm-sorting technology designed to
produce conception of desired sex); Amy Dockser Marcus, Ensuring Your Baby Will Be
Healthy: Embryo Screening Test Gains in Popularity and Controversy, WALL ST. J., July 25,
2002, at D1 (discussing prenatal genetic diagnosis); Claudia Kalb, Brave New Babies,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2004, at 45; see also Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, THE
ATLANTIC, April, 2004, at 51, 53, 56 (explaining how sex selection and other ways of choosing
characteristics of offpring contravenes "ethic of giftedness," that is, appreciating "children as
gifts" and accepting "them as they come"); THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIoETmIcs, BEYOND
THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSurT OF HAPPINESS, Ch. 2, § 2 (Oct. 2003), at
www.bioethics.gov.
44. Near the end of Middlesex, Cal observes: "Tessie Stephanides [his mother], who in
a different lifetime when space travel was new had decided to go along with her husband and
create a girl by devious means, now saw before her ... the fruit of that scheme." EUGENIDES,
supra note 1, at 519. See also id. at 422-23; Sandel, supra note 43, at 57 ("The problem lies in
the hubris of the designing parents, in their drive to master the mystery of birth.").
45. See, e.g., LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: How GENETIC ENGINEERING AND
CLONING WI.L TRANSFORM THE AMERICAN FAMILY 266-80 (1998); see also, e.g., FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, OUR PosTHuMAN FuTuRE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION
(2002); BARBARA KATz ROTHMAN, THE BOOK OF LIFE: A PERSONAL AND ETHICAL GUtnE TO
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When adolescent Cal takes charge of his own destiny, he causes us to reflect further
on the meaning of parental autonomy. How many of us have learned as parents that,
although the Constitution gives us the freedom to direct the upbringing of our children
as against the state, our children themselves often have their own plans? How did my
sons turn out to be Republicans? Despite the many interesting theoretical debates about
46whether parents or the state can better speak for the child, often in real life our
children speak for themselves, with an independence and resiliency that defies both
parental autonomy and government control.47 The challenge lies in determining how
we can "bring up the child in the way [we think he or she] should go, ' 48 while still
respecting each child's autonomous self.
C. Misguided Medics
In David's story, Dr. John Money emerges as the villain of the piece. According to
Colapinto's report in As Nature Made Him, David's (then Bruce's) terrified parents
bent over backwards to find some way to address the awful circumcision accident that
had befallen their baby,49 only to land in the clutches of the evil Dr. Money, a
psychologist at Johns Hopkins,5° who made the child a guinea pig in the ruthless
pursuit of his own experimental agenda.5' Money might well have proved convincing
when he initially made the case that the only hope of a normal life for the penis-less
boy lay in castration, reassignment, and appropriately gendered childrearing. Colapinto
brings to light, however, many details that undermine Money's credibility. Most
significantly, Money persistently ignored the many indications that his patient was not
successfully adapting to her assigned gender.5" Two other damaging details that stand
out in Colapinto's expos6 are Money's apparent preoccupation with all things sexual,
including his insistence that the Reimer twins engage in simulated sexual conduct
RACE, NORMALITY, AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROjECT (2001); Sandel,
supra note 43.
46. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizing in truancy prosecution
against Amish parents exception from compulsory school attendance after eighth grade); id. at
241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting separate interests of Amish children); see also, e.g.,
Dena S. Davis, The Child's Right to an Open Future: Yoder and Beyond, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 93
(1997); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U.CI. L. REv.
937 (1996); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 995 (1992).
47. Sometimes we see evidence of such independence on the part of children in status-
offense cases. See, e.g., In re Polovehak, 454 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. 1983); In re Lori M., 496
N.Y.S.2d 940 (Fam. Ct. 1985). Of course, emancipation shows a child's independence, but
eliminates the tension with parents by legally freeing the child from parental control. See, e.g.,
Roe v. Doe, 272 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1971); State v. C.R., 797 P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
48. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944).
49. See COLAPINrro, supra note 22, at xvii (quoting David's reflections on the
desperation that led his parents to Money).
50. Id. at 36.
51. Id. at 50. Indeed, this conclusion would hold even if a primary cause of David's
distress turned out to be the secrecy that Money insisted was required.
52. Id. at 80-81.
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during some of the required yearly visits to Johns Hopkins, 53 and an earlier paper in
which Money had determined that untreated intersexed children develop in a
psychologically normal way, despite their unusual genitalia. 54 Nonetheless, David
eventually overcomes this Goliath (choosing his new name in the process), 55 thus
discrediting Money's theories of gender. Still, Money continued to recommend the
approach he had sold to the Reimers even after David resumed a male identity, 56 and
he never issued a retraction even after David's suicide.
57
Money's thinly disguised counterpart in Middlesex is Dr. Peter Luce.18 Callie's
parents take her to see Dr. Luce in New York, as adolescence begins to wreak havoc
with her presumed femaleness. Although Callie's peek at Luce's written report causes
pain because of the use of terminology she discovers means "monster," Luce never
inflicts the harm on Callie that Money had inflicted on David. 59 Callie undergoes some
extensive physical examinations, 60 but flees before having any recommended hormonal
treatments or genital surgery.
6
'
In revisiting David's story, Middlesex forges a less treacherous path to a "happy"
ending for the central figure. After discovering the medical facts, Callie escapes from
New York, decides to become Cal, and experiences wild adventures fit for a Homeric
odyssey before eventually returning home to suburban Detroit. All of the challenges he
encounters along the way, however, pale in comparison to the excruciating difficulties
that David endured. Luce, unlike Money, never becomes the brooding presence
responsible for misshaping his patient's life. Indeed, if any physician in Middlesex
53. Id. at 86-88. Money's preoccupation apparently is not unusual among those treating
intersexed patients. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 86 (describing one doctor who
masturbated intersexed boys to achieve erection and invasive procedures endured by girls with
genital anomalies).
54. See COLAPINTO, supra note 22, at 233-35. Colapinto dramatically saves this bit of
information about Money's Ph.D. dissertation until close to the end of the book.
55. Id. at xvi, 182.
56. Id. at 276.
57. See Woo, supra note 31.
58. Colapinto has remarked on the similarity of the real and fictional "famous
turtleneck-sweater-sporting sex researcher[s]" in his book and Eugenides's novel respectively.
John Colapinto & Judith Shulevitz, Middlesex, SLATE, Sept. 17, 2002, at
http://slate.msn.com/?=2071015&entry=2071021. No doubt, another inspiration for the fictional
Dr. Luce comes from French feminist theory. See Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, in
WRITING ON THE BODY: FEMALE EMBODIMENT AND FEMINIST THEORY 248,251 (Katie Conboy,
Nadia Medina, and Sarah Stanbury eds., 1997).
59. David, although castrated as a child, successfully resisted the final surgery that
Money had planned, to lower the urethra and to create a vagina. COLAPINTO, supra note 22, at
93-96.
60. The conclusion that Callie does not suffer the harm David endured is relative; one
should hardly underestimate the distress experienced by a patient who is made to feel like a
medical curiosity, especially when the examinations prompt sexual arousal, shame, and
discomfort. See PREVEs, supra note 4, at 62, 73, 79 (reporting patients' experiences).
61. After Callie's escape, the reader is left knowing the error of Luce's proposed
intervention. Like Money, Luce continued to publicize his patient to "prove" his theory of
gender as an acquired social status that physicians and parents can choose for children. See
EUGENIDES, supra note 1, at 479.
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should bear that responsibility, it is Dr. Nishan Philobosian, a kindly family friend,
who immigrated to America with Cal's grandparents and made the erroneous
pronouncement at Callie's birth that the baby was a girl. However, this doctor's failing
eyesight and temporary distraction (which cause his superficial inspection of the
infant's genitals) 62 provide a striking contrast to the willful blindness that Money
displays in assessing Brenda Reimer's ongoing progress. By stripping away the
despair, terror, and stunning medical arrogance that pervade David's history, Cal's tale
brings into focus the questions that both stories share about well-meaning parents' need
to rely on experts and the experts' all-too-common errors.
The autonomy that guarantees the freedom to rear one's child also includes parental
choices about medical care,63 as well as education, religious training, and other
important facets of upbringing. Although the Constitution entrusts such authority to
parents on the theory that their natural affection will prompt them to act in the child's
best interests,64 what assurances do parents have when they must turn to doctors,
educators, or other experts? For example, although the Supreme Court in Parham v.
J.R. writes eloquently about the care and concern of parents who seek to admit a child
to a mental institution and the mediating role played by the admitting physician's
expertise,65 suppose the physician makes a mistake? 66
The current debate about surgical intervention for intersexed infants provides one
particularly vivid illustration of the problem poignantly suggested by David's and Cal's
stories. For many years, physicians treated intersex as a disease67 and persuaded
concerned parents of babies born with ambiguous genitalia that feminizing surgery
promised the only hope for a "normal" life.68 Indeed, John Money's work proved
instrumental in establishing this approach, although we certainly cannot conclude that
all who have implemented this standard of care behaved as wickedly as Money is
portrayed in As Nature Made Him. Today, intersex activists have effectively
challenged the conventional wisdom by calling for a moratorium on surgery until the
child-patient can decide.69 For some, parents and doctors had chosen the "wrong"
62. Id. at 216, 361.
63. The generalization covers at least conventional medical treatment sought or declined
in good faith. See, e.g., In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). But see
Guardianship of Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
64. E.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
65. Id. at 607-12.
66. Parham acknowledges but minimizes the possibility of medical error. Id. at 611-13.
67. See, e.g., PREVES, supra note 4, at 89.
68. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 38, at 42-58 (examining defects in parental
informed consent to such procedures under prevailing standards of care); Kishka-Kamari Ford,
Note, "First, Do No Harm"-The Fiction of Legal Parental Consent to Genital-Normalizing
Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 469, 479-88 (2001) (arguing that with
no documented benefits, such surgery remains experimental, leaving parents unable to provide
legal consent); see also Navarro, supra note 9, at 1 (examining parental dilemma). Yet this
approach, designed to free the intersexed child from the stigma of being unusual, in fact
imposed stigma. See PREvas, supra note 4, at 145.
69. See Kenneth Kipnis & Milton Diamond, Pediatric Ethics and the Surgical
Assignment of Sex, 9 J. CUN. ETHics 398 (Winter 1998). New studies support this
recommendation. See William G. Reiner & John P. Gearhart, Discordant Sexual Identity in
Some Genetic Males with Cloacal Exstrophy Assigned to Female Sex at Birth, 350 N. ENG. J.
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gender in this irreversible surgical assignment; for others, openly living as neither a
male nor a female would prove more comfortable; and for virtually all, the loss of
capacity for sexual pleasure caused by the surgery demonstrates the tragic
thoughtlessness of such intervention.
70
Other phenomena of contemporary culture raise similar questions: when physicians
and educators label a child "ADHD" and recommend Ritalin, what's a concerned
parent to do?71 Is a child's ability to comply with the expectations imposed by
American schools so essential that resort to personality-altering drugs becomes not
only a justifiable decision, but also a wise and loving one? The belated discovery of the
harms to future generations caused by DES,72 the noteworthy miscalculations of some
physicians who went to court to compel unwilling pregnant women to deliver by
Caesarian section,73 and the use of radiation to treat birthmarks in ignorance of the
ensuing cancer risk74 all give such questions added force. The Reimers and
Stephanides were not alone in turning to experts whose views, in hindsight, were
misguided. When parents seek help for a child and their efforts, in fact, cause harm,
parent and child alike suffer an especially painful and lasting wound.7
MED. 333 (2004); see also Claudia Kolker, The Cutting Edge, SLATE, June 8, 2004 at
http://www.slate.com/id/2102006 (contrasting old and new approaches).
70. See generally PREVES, supra note 4 (discussing interviews with intersexed adults);
see also KEssLER, supra note 24, at 56.
71. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 43, at 94; Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Preschool Meds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 59.
72. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
73. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc); In re Baby Boy Doe,
632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The
Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951 (1986); see also Veronika E. B.
Kolder, M.D. et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 N. ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1193
(1987) (reporting suicide of husband who could not prevent forced Caesarian section on wife).
74. See, e.g., Jane Friedman, After 50 Years, Radiation Leads to Thyroid Surgery,
WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1999, Health Section, at ZI 1.
I intend here to distinguish garden-variety malpractice cases; with the examples about DES,
forced Caesarians, and radiation treatment for birthmarks, an entire school of thought is later
determined to be misguided.
75. See the letter from Jean Lakeman Helms, mother of an intersexed child, expressing
regret that she consented to surgery for her infant:
. . .[T]he medical world treats intersex as a "social emergency," requiring
immediate treatment through surgery, hormones and rigid secrecy. Most parents
are never told to let the child know that he or she was born intersexed, or even as a
member of the opposite sex!
The fear and guilt we as parents feel is made a thousand times worse by the
secrecy, by the implication that our child's genitalia are so horrible that no one
must ever know-especially our child.
We are urged to act quickly. We have little time to think about alternatives; all
we want is for our babies to be all right, and so we sign on the dotted line.
The problem is that the typical treatment-arbitrary gender assignment,
followed by genital surgery--doesn't fix the problem. In fact, for most intersex
people and their families, it makes things much, much worse.
Unwanted, unconsented-to genital surgery leaves people just as different as
they were before, but with less function, more pain and more shame. The scarred,
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D. Playing the Gender Card
Having reviewed the less prominent insights that Cal's narrative helps us identify in
David Reimer's history, we can now return to the more obvious theme, the
contributions of these stories to our understanding of sex and gender. Once again,
David's case is presented starkly, in black and white. According to Colapinto, David
was clearly and inherently a male, and nothing anyone could do would have made him
female.
6
Cal's story, by contrast, emerges in more telling shades of gray. Even after assuming
a male identity consistent with his chromosomes, Cal wistfully notes the many ways in
which he still acts and feels like a woman, particularly in the relationship he shares
with his mother:
You will want to know: How did we get used to things? What happened to our
memories? Did Calliope have to die in order to make room for Cal? To all these
questions I offer the same truism: it's amazing what you can get used to. After I
returned from San Francisco and started living as a male, my family found that,
contrary to popular opinion, gender was not all that important. My change from
girl to boy was far less dramatic than the distance anybody travels from infancy to
adulthood. In most ways I remained the person I'd always been. Even now, though
I live as a man, I remain in essential ways Tessie's daughter. I'm still the one who
remembers to call her every Sunday. I'm the one she recounts her growing list of
ailments to. Like any good daughter, Ill be the one to nurse her in her old age.7
remodeled genitals don't look or work anything like the genitals most people are
born with.
I wish I had known that when my daughter Emily was diagnosed.
Fundraising Appeal of the Intersex Society of North America (2003) (on file with author).
76. Compare Cal's recollections, infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text, with
Colapinto's description of David:
[Tihe strongest impression I was left with was of David's unequivocal masculinity.
His gestures, walk, attitudes, tastes, vocabulary-none of them betrayed the least
hint that he had been raised as a girl. And indeed, when I asked whether he
thought his extraordinary childhood had given him a special insight into women,
he dismissed the question. David had apparently never been a girl-not in his
mind, where it counts.
COLAPINTO, supra note 22, at 215-16.
77. EUGENIDES, supra note 1, at 520-21. See also id. at 41-42:
I've lived more than half my life as a male, and by now everything comes
naturally. When Calliope surfaces, she does so like a childhood speech
impediment. Suddenly there she is again, doing a hair flip, or checking her nails.
It's a little like being possessed. Callie rises up inside me, wearing my skin like a
loose robe .... On the sidewalk I'll feel her girlish walk take over, and the
movement brings back a kind of emotion, a desolate and gossipy sympathy for the
girls I see coming home from school.
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Rather than sharply rejecting such remnants of his past, 78 Cal values the
"stereoscopic" vision that his double life has afforded him.79 Perhaps the fictional
Cal's pacific childhood permits him to embrace his past in a way foreclosed by the
brutality of David's early experience. In any event, on the subject of gender, Cal's
story does more than bring to the surface subtextual elements of David's history; it
offers a contrasting lesson.
Significantly, Cal's more open and nuanced retrospective look at gender is not
based on any sort of physical ambiguity or duality. Recall that Cal is what the medical
literature calls a "pseudohermaphrodite," not a "true hermaphrodite." 8 At the point in
his life when he is narrating his story, he is (and, in fact, always was) physically male
with XY chromosomes and testicles (though undescended), whatever the outward
appearance of his genitalia. To the extent that one's chromosomes and gonads at birth
determine the sex classification, 81 Cal is just like David Reimer. Yet Cal's experience
emphasizes what transsexuals long have said: gender has a critical psychological
component.8 2 For Cal, this component comes from his childhood as a girl, another
biographical fact he shares with David, notwithstanding David's very different
assessment of his own experience.
Eugenides has stated that the title Middlesex comes from the name of the street on
which his family lived during part of his childhood.8 3 It obviously has a nice ring for
the name of a book about a hermaphrodite.8 4 The title has meaning on other levels as
well. In recognition of his chromosomes, hormones, and physical attraction to women
(including an adolescent crush on a female classmate), Cal chooses maleness, a choice
that requires him temporarily to abandon his family and to reject the medical care
recommended to his parents. Because he also chooses not to repudiate his past,
however, Cal leaves ample room for an understanding of gender that defies a rigid
either/or paradigm and that encompasses one's emotions, relationships, culture, and
approach to the world. Even after the denouement, Cal as a man occupies a space
78. See id. at 479 ("I never felt out of place being a girl. I still don't feel entirely at
home among men.").
79. In looking back on his childhood, Cal observes: "Already latent inside me, like the
future 120 mph serve of a tennis prodigy, was the ability to communicate between the genders,
to see not with the monovision of one sex but in the stereoscope of both." Id. at 269.
80. "I'm not androgynous in the least." Id. at 41. On the evolution of the categories of
"male pseudohermaphrodite" and "female pseudohermaphrodite," which rely on an
understanding of "true sex" tied to gonads and significantly narrow the classification of "true
hermaphrodites," see DREGER, supra note 30, at 36-38.
81. Of course, these are highly contested matters, with the bases for sex classification
reflecting not scientific "truth," but social and cultural values. See infra Part I.A.
82. See, e.g., JENNIFER FINNEY BOYLAN, SnE's NOTTHERE: A LIFE iN Two GENDERS 22
(2003). But see In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1093 (Kan. Ci. App. 2001) (considering
neurological basis for gender identity disorders), rev'd in part, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002);
William Kitchin, The Fundamental Right To Be Free of Arbitrary Categorization: The Brain
Sciences and the Issue of Sex Classification, 42 WASHuRN L.J. 257, 266 (2003) (attributing
such difference to brain function patterns).
83. See Goldstein, supra note 2.
84. A support group for intersexed individuals previously recognized the usefulness of
the term, calling itself the Middlesex group and locating in Middlesex County, Massachusetts.
See PREvEs, supra note 4, at 139.
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somewhere between male and female-in sharp contrast to the "macho" persona
exhibited by David Reimer as an adult.
In addition, Middlesex stakes out a middle ground in the nature/nurture debate,
avoiding both the position that John Money tried to establish through his "treatment"
of David Reimer and the complete repudiation of this position that John Colapinto
advances in As Nature Made Him.85 As a result, Colapinto misses the mark when, in
commenting on Middlesex, he says that he had "already written the same story, as
nonfiction, three years [before]." ' 6 Although Colapinto later reconsiders this
comparison,87 he proceeds to take Eugenides to task for writing about a child whose
intersex condition is not apparent until adolescence, so that "no family drama attends
Callie's birth and childhood." 88 Yet why does Colapinto believe that noticeably
ambiguous genitalia at birth and during childhood provide the gold standard for family
drama about intersexuality? Certainly, Colapinto's own book presented considerable
family drama, although the Reimer family's predicament was much more unusual than
Cal's situation and David was "normal" at birth. For both David and Cal, the real
drama reaches full bloom at adolescence. In the final analysis, Colapinto's critique
overlooks all the possibilities that Cal's 5-alpha-reductase deficiency syndrome opens
for exploration, which would have been missing if Eugenides had taken Colapinto's
preferred road: Cal's transformation and his resulting "stereoscopic" vision, his
family's adjustment to the transformation and its message about the relative
insignificance of gender,8 9 and the opportunity to highlight the important roles of both
85. Scholars have challenged this dichotomy. See, e.g., FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note
11, at 26 (noting that the ease with which debates about a biological basis for sexual orientation
"evoke the nature/nurture divide is a consequence of... a nonsystems approach").
David's suicide, see supra note 31 and accompanying text, postdated the publication of
Colapinto's book. David's identical twin, Brian, also committed suicide. See Woo, supra note
3 1. These facts themselves raise interesting nature-versus-nurture questions about the respective
roles of any possible genetic predisposition to severe depression and the twins' joint
involvement (albeit in very different ways) in Money's experiment. Still, it is clear that Brian's
suicide makes it impossible to conclude that David's reassignment alone "caused" the latter's
suicide. Colapinto readily concedes that genetics likely played a part. See John Colapinto,
Gender Gap, SLATE, at http://www.slate.cortid/2101678 (June 3, 2004).
86. Colapinto & Shulevitz, supra note 58.
87. See id. ("And all facetiousness aside, Eugenides's book couldn't really be more
different than mine.").
88. Id. Colapinto explains:
The drama of hermaphroditism is nothing if not a family drama. It is a condition
that sends a shock wave rocketing through the generations and one that forces each
member of that family-parents and grandparents, nieces and nephews, cousins
and siblings-to confront their deepest biases and beliefs about gender. Any
expert in intersexuality will tell you that the birth of a sexually ambiguous child
into a family strong in immigrant beliefs and background is particularly disruptive
since such families often operate under comparatively rigid, traditional notions
about the roles of men and women ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
89. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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nature and nurture.90 For the most part, I like Middlesex just the way Eugenides wrote
it.
Yet do any of these positive features of Middlesex satisfactorily explain why
Eugenides has Callie choose to become Cal, that is, to trade a female for a male
identity? Instead, Callie could have decided to remain female (with or without
anatomical "correction") or, alternatively, to live outside traditional gender boundaries
altogether.9' What does the story's conclusion teach us? I see in Cal's choice the
irresistible pull of privilege. Becoming a straight male allows Cal to move to the very
top of the gender hierarchy.92 If a character whose understanding of gender is as
multifaceted and capacious as Cal's cannot resist making this move, then how could
anyone have expected David Reimer not to feel especially aggrieved about his loss,
through deception, of his birthright--the superior status, maleness, that he felt
belonged to him? 93
Cal's story thus helps us to find new meanings in David's. Yet perhaps the
important question transcends both of these individuals, whose extraordinary lives
make the ordinary implications easy to overlook. Would every adolescent girl, if given
the choice, become male? My own experience tells me no, and, of course, the chosen
reassignment of male-to-female transsexuals shows that some forces trump privilege.
94
Nonetheless, the persistence of the gender hierarchy and the troubling evidence of
adolescent girls' depression95 make the hypothesis worth pondering, especially as we
consider the role law might play.
90. Of course, the plot that Colapinto prefers also would have missed the creative
twist that Eugenides brings to the problems of family secrecy, parental control, and reliance on
fallible experts. See supra notes 34-75 and accompanying text.
91. True, Cal (then Callie) probably understood that the genital surgery proposed by
Dr. Luce might have impaired a part of her body-her "blooming crocus"-that had recently
brought her pleasure. See EUGENIDES, supra note 1, at 432-39; see also supra text
accompanying note 5. Still, becoming a male could not have been the only way to avoid the
surgery.
92. Anne Fausto-Sterling reports that most intersexed youths, when offered some
choice, have opted to become male-in our own culture and others as well. FAUSTO-STERLING,
supra note 11, at 43, 95, 109.
93. See CoLAPlwrO, supra note 22, at 262-63, 265; see also Janet Halley, Sexuality
Harassment, in LEFr LEGALIsM/LEFT CRITIQUE 80, 90 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds.,
2002) (reviewing Catharine MacKinnon's Brief of Amici Curiae National Organization on
Male Sexual Victimization, Inc., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75
(1998) (1997 WL 471814), in a male-male sexual harassment case, emphasizing that plaintiffs
"primary, definitional injury is the loss of masculine superordination").
94. In the analogous context of the racial hierarchy, there are notable examples of
those who could "pass" as white but have chosen to identify as African-American. See, e.g.,
JuDY ScALEs-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, COLOR, COMMUNITY (1995);
GREGORY HOWARD WaILIAMs, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE: THE TRUE SToRY OF A WHTE BOY WHO
DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK (1995). I am in no position to generalize here, and gender privilege
and race privilege might not operate analogously at all. Indeed, Williams's memoir presents a
fascinating story of "transformation" from one identity to another with which to compare Cal's.
On the harms of "passing" and similar assimilationist efforts, see Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111
YALE L. 769 (2002).
95. See, e.g., MARY PIPHER, REVIVING OPHELIA: SAVING THE SELVES OF ADOLESCENT
GrRLs (1994).
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I1. THROUGH THE LEGAL LOOKING GLASS
In our society (and others as well), gender- and sex-based classifications have
formed the building blocks of hierarchy. 96 To the extent that law either reinforces or
attempts to reject these classifications and the resulting inequalities, sex and gender
97differences become legal issues.
Before considering the implications that Cal and his cohort might have for such
legal issues, some preparatory housekeeping becomes necessary. To set the stage,
foundational material follows, including a digression on the terms used to discuss
transgender issues and the way medicine has shaped this discussion, a review of
relevant legal precedents and rules, and a look at particular questions of sex and gender
that the law has been asked to address recently. Then, we can return to the
contributions of Cal and his story.
A. Transgender Terminology
1. Male and Female: Sex, Gender, Sexuality, and Sex Roles
Given the way we ordinarily take "male" and "female" categories for granted,
choosing the best terminology proves difficult or at least requires some clarification.
These are first-order issues. Even progressive gender politics, such as the struggles for
women's equality and gay rights,98 typically assume a threshold ability to identify
males and females (queer theorists' resistance to such categories notwithstandinga). A
similar assumption certainly underlies the position of those who cling to more
traditional roles for males and femalesi °° and who would discriminate against gays and
lesbians (as reflected in the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, for example10 1)
or would criminalize all same-sex sexual conduct (as reflected in the law challenged,
successfully, in Lawrence v. Texas1 02).
96. See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 11, at 266-67 (reviewing "pecking orders").
97. Of course, one could talk about religion, for example, as well as law, as a system
that shares a dynamic relationship with sex and gender classifications. See Letter to the Bishops
of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church and the World
(July 31, 2004) [hereinafter Letter to Bishops] (available at
http://www.vatican.valroman-curialcongregationslcfaithldocuments/rc-con cfaith doc_200407
3 1_collaborationen.html) (last visited Feb. 19, 2005) (critiquing, inter alia, feminists' emphasis
on subordination and "gender," minimization of physical difference, and "new model of
polymorphous sexuality").
98. Note, however, that the so-called gay rights movement now typically seeks to
ensure legal protection for persons with a range of "nontraditional" sexual identities and
sexualities, usually under the banner of "GLBT," for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered
persons. See, e.g., PREVES, supra note 4, at 88, 149.
99. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 93, at 82, 94-96.
100. See, e.g., Letter to the Bishops, supra note 97.
101.10 U.S.C. §654 (2000).
102. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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"Male" and "female" are used to refer to both "sex" and "gender." Although uses of
"sex" and "gender" in law and society often seem interchangeable, 0 3 Alice Domurat
Dreger helpfully explains that "sex" is usually "considered a strictly anatomical
category" while "gender" is "used as a category of self-and/or social
identification."'04 Others push this understanding further by emphasizing gender's
performative character, with the conclusion that "being" male or female simply entails
engaging in a collection of acts and self-presentations.'
0 5
As Dreger elaborates, definitions of "male" and "female" are contextual, "specific
to time and place."'1° Her book, Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex,
examines the efforts of "medical men" in France and England during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to resolve the status, as male or female, of
those who presented ambiguous or incongruous physical characteristics. Emphasizing
the cultural discomfort with ambiguity and the need to have one "sex" applied to each
body, 107 Dreger traces the evolution of tests and criteria designed to allow virtually
everyone to be labeled either male or female; in the process, Dreger shows how the
medical profession decided the social meaning of these categories. Writing before and
after Dreger, other scholars, including Judith Butler, Suzanne Kessler, and Anne
Fausto-Sterling, have made similar points about our socially constructed
understandings of even the most physical indicia of sex.
08
As the references from today's popular culture indicate, challenges to the traditional
categories come from two main sources: transsexuals (those whose self-identity and
physical sex diverge, at least until reassignment surgery) 1°9 and intersexed
103. See Valdes, supra note 11, at 134, 325; see also JuDrrH BUTLER, BODIES THAT
MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEx" 4-5 (1993) [hereinafter BUTLER, BODIES THAT
MATTER] (noting how gender tends to absorb sex); id. at 28 (challenging the presumption that
sex is "the irreducible point of departure" for gender); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:
FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990) [hereinafter BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE];
Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1995); Taylor Flynn, Essay,
Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex
and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392,416 (2001) (transgender rights cases
"provide a means of disentangling gender from anatomy"); Katherine M. Franke, The Central
Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sexfrom Gender, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (1995).
104. DREGER, supra note 30, at 10.
105. See BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 103, at 24-25.
106. DREGER, supra note 30, at 10. For example, even with a focus on biological
attributes alone, one could not consider chromosomes until the development of a test for them.
See also BUTLER, supra note 32, at 15-16, 210 (emphasizing external, contextual gender
norms).
107. See id. at 107-09, 153.
108. See BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER, supra note 103; FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note
11; KESSLER, supra note 24; see also Yoshino, supra note 94, at 865-71 (interpreting Butler's
"performativity"). For Judith Butler's most recent examination of these issues, see generally
BUTLER, supra note 32.
109. Estimates of the number of transsexuals in the United States range from a low of
3000 to a high of 60,000. See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: intersexuality
and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 265, 289 & n.161 (1999); see
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individuals ° (those who are born with ambiguous genitalia or unusual chromosomal
or gonadal composition or who have a physical condition, such as androgen
insensitivity syndrome, resulting in an outward appearance inconsistent with
chromosomal sex).' Although some use "transgendered" in a narrow sense to refer
only to transsexuals, in today's common parlance the term has a more expansive
meaning that also includes intersexed individuals, as in the names of many different
"GLBT" (gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered) advocacy and support groups.'
2
Applying these terms, those who seek sex reassignment surgery are generally called
transsexuals or transgendered individuals." 3 David Reimer probably belonged under
one of these headings during the period when he was being reared as Brenda, although
his problems were imposed upon him by others, not his own physical or even
emotional attributes. Cal's 5-alpha-reductase deficiency syndrome makes him
intersexed because he appeared anatomically female during childhood, although he was
chromosomally and gonadally male. But young Callie also could fit the transsexual
category to the extent she was (albeit unknowingly) a male living as (occupying the
apparent body of?) a female, and so could Cal, a male who had previously lived as a
female. As these applications show, the attempt to categorize here presents as many
difficulties as the more basic attempt to label everyone as male or female-again
putting in play the underlying meaning of the terms themselves.
Although transsexuals and intersexed persons arguably complicate the ordinary
concepts of sex and gender in different ways, in the final analysis both demonstrate that
multiple factors contribute to "maleness" and "femaleness"-inviting the possibility
that one person might have attributes from both categories and defying an immutable
either/or approach to classification. Perhaps it is helpful to imagine here one continuum
or axis for sex and another for gender, with male and female each at one end of each
continuum but with intermediate places for those who do not belong at either
extreme. 1
4
also Helen G. Berrigan, Transsexual Marriage: A Trans-Atlantic Judicial Dialogue, 12 LAw &
SEXUALITY 87, 88 n.6 (2003) (reporting that in Europe about one in 30,000 adult males and one
in 100,000 adult females seek sex-reassignment surgery).
110. On the use of "intersexed" versus "intersexual," see Kessler, supra note 24, at 85.
111. One study estimates the frequency of intersex to be approximately 2% of live
births. Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis, 12
Am. J. HUM. BIOLOGY 151, 161 (2000).
112. See supra note 98 (citing PREVES, supra note 4 at 88, 149); see also BUTLER, supra
note 32, at 6-7, 217, 219 (explaining how "intersex and transsex" challenge "natural
dimorphism); Flynn, supra note 103, at 392 ("'transgender' . . . applies to persons whose
appearance, behavior, or other personal characteristics differ from traditional gender norms").
113. In a book that has evoked enormous controversy, J. Michael Bailey posits two
types of transsexuals: homosexual ("extremely feminine gay men") and autogynephilic ("men
erotically obsessed with the image of themselves as women"). BAILEY, supra note 9, at 146. See
also Robert Becker, NU Investigates Charges over Book; No Consent to Use Stories, Critics
Say, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 2003, § 1, at 2; Robin Wilson, Dr. Sex: A Human-Sexuality Expert
Creates Controversy with a New Book on Gay Men and Transsexuals, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
June 20, 2003, at A8.
114. See, e.g., SANDRA LIPsrz BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE
DEBATE ON SEXUAL EQUALITY (1993); see also FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 78
(suggesting recognition of five sexes); Greenberg, supra note 109, at 275 (rejecting binary view
because "sex and gender range across a spectrum"). Some cultures have additional categories for
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Yet sex and gender do not represent the only axes to contemplate. As Francisco
Valdes underscores, sexuality provides another relevant reference, although western
law and society habitually conflate these three variables.'1 5 So long as homosexuality
remains deviant, part of the basic understanding of "male" entails sexual attraction to
females and vice versa."16 This was certainly true in the historical period Dreger
examines, and she theorizes that homophobia explains the apparent medical necessity
of finding each person's "true sex." '1 7 She recounts how the abhorrence of
homosexuality prompted several doctors to disrupt their patients' lives by assigning a
new sex even after adulthood and marriage in an effort to halt improper sexual
unions." 
8
Finally, beyond sex, gender, and sexuality, lie gender roles. This axis or continuum
merits separate consideration because, here, it seems that the law has developed the
greatest comfort with ambiguity and the freedom to defy traditional categories. 19 As
shown below, the Supreme Court and other lawmakers have exploded traditional
gender roles, facilitating the movement of both males and females along this particular
continuum, 120 regardless of anatomy, chromosomes, self-presentation, performance, or
sexual orientation.' That is to say, roles traditionally assigned to men or to women are
now open to anyone. Nonetheless, the implications that might follow from such law
a third sex or a third gender. For example, Greenberg writes about children from the Dominican
Republic and New Guinea with the developmental pattern that Cal experienced. Their cultures
have special names for them, avoiding the necessity for them to fit a male or female
classification. Id. at 276. But see FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 109 ("While these
cultures know that sometimes a third type of child is born, they nevertheless recognize only two
gender roles."). Cf. BAILEY, supra note 9, at 144 (rejecting "an either-or label" for transsexuality
in favor of a continuum).
115. See generally Valdes, supra note 11; see also Danielle Kie Hart, Same-Sex
Marriage Revisited: Taking a Critical Look at Baehr v. Lewin, 9 GEo. MASON U. CIv. RTS. L.J.
1, 9 (1998) (summarizing Valdes, supra note 11, who contends that the conflation of sex,
gender, and sexual orientation in American law and society "not only molds everyone subject to
it into 'correct' sex and gender roles, it also creates and perpetuates an ideology [of] 'hetero-
patriarchy,' which privileges male/masculinity over female/femininity").
116. DREGER, supra note 30, at 135-36. See id. at 153; see also BUTMER, supra note 32,
at 54, 181-85 (examining gender versus sexuality); Halley, supra note 93, at 91 (citing
Catherine Maclinnon); KESSLER, supra note 24, at 106 (citing Anne Fausto-Sterling); PREvES,
supra note 4, at 17 (citing Judith Butler). Again, however, a continuum, rather than clearly
defined categorization, no doubt offers a more accurate way to think about sexual behavior. See,
e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason:
Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333, 361 (1992).
117. See DREGER, supra note 30, at 8-9; see also id. at 31, 76, 88.
118. See id. at 110-13, 119-20.
119. Adding another wrinkle to the nature/nurture debate, Fausto-Sterling notes that
some scientists believe that biology might play a larger role in the development of gender roles
and sexual orientation than it plays in the development of gender identity. FAUSTO-STERLING,
supra note 11, at 71.
120. As Fausto-Sterling notes, this legal trend shares a theoretical kinship with Money's
work. "Paradoxically, theories of medical treatment of intersexuality undermine beliefs about
the biological inevitability of contemporary sex roles. Theorists such as Money suggest that
under certain circumstances the body is irrelevant for the creation of conventional masculinity
and femininity." Id. at 76.
121. See infra notes 143-58 and accompanying text.
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reforms remain open for debate: across-the-board legal recognition of one's own
choice of gender identity; blurred gender lines; or the repudiation of all sex, gender,
and sexuality categories.
22
2. Male Norms and Female "Defaults"
Labels and other forms of expression help construct the way we see the world. One
frequent critique of the law points out the male norm that provides the underlying
assumptions for many legal rules. This norm reflects and reinforces the gender
hierarchy. To cite one illustration, Wendy Williams has condemned the Supreme
Court's approach to pregnancy discrimination exemplified in Geduldig v. Aiello'23 and
General Electric Company v. Gilbert.124 In both cases, the Court upheld an insurance
plan that covered all disabilities except pregnancy, on the theory that the exclusion of
this one "additional risk, unique to women" did not represent sex-based
discrimination.' 25 Williams writes that the Court's reasoning "makes breathtakingly
explicit the underlying philosophy of the majority of the justices in Geduldig and
Gilbert. Pregnancy .. . is an 'extra,' an add-on to the basic male model for
humanity."'126 Legal scholars have criticized the male norm in examining many other
problems, including tort law's reluctance to compensate for emotional injuries," the
Internal Revenue Code's failure to tax housework,1 28 and the doctrine of family
privacy.'
29
Against this background of a legal male norm, the medical description of the female
body as the "default" model stands out as quite striking. In explaining how embryonic
sex differentiation occurs, medical authorities state that the action of masculinizing
hormones on the default embryo creates a normal male. 130 In the absence of such
122. Queer theorists would urge this last outcome. See supra note 99 and accompanying
text. But see Case, supra note 103, at 75.
123. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
124. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
125. Id. at 139 (emphasis omitted).
126. Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325,345-46 (1984-
1985). Congress later rejected the Court's analysis by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (2000).
127. Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A
History, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 814 (1990).
128. Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996).
129. See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the
Role of Law, in THE PoLmcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 328 (David Kairys ed., 1998);
see also Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U.
FLA. L. REv. 627 (1987); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV.
973 (1991).
130. See, e.g., FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 202-05; see also PREVES, supra
note 4, at 23-26 (explaining process in simple terms, with illustrations). Interestingly, early
religious understandings of reproduction placed the point of "animation" or "ensoulment" at
forty days after conception for males and eighty days for females. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 133-34 & n.22, 160 (1973); see also Franke, supra note 103, at 72 (noting pre-
Enlightenment views of perfection of the male body).
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hormones or in situations in which sensitivity to such hormones is impaired, the
embryo remains in the default, or female, status-or at least appears to do so. The
brain of a male embryo, denied exposure to masculinizing hormones, will retain its
default or female status according to one explanation for some forms of
transsexualism.'31
What does such terminology communicate about our understanding of the gender
hierarchy? Does it suggest a female norm or baseline, in contrast to the male norm that
scholars have found in many legal principles? Under this interpretation, is it possible,
to paraphrase Wendy Williams, that masculinization represents "an add-on to the basic
[felmale model for humanity?" Alternatively, does the notion of the female as the
default model simply reflect and reinforce the existing males-first hierarchy? From this
perspective, women are defined by the absence of something that men have, not
affirmatively by their own special characteristics. 132 Correspondingly, men have
something special-whether testicles, chromosomes, or hormones-that women lack.
131. See In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 77 (Md. 2003) (quoting William Reiner, To Be
Male or Female-That is the Question, 151 ARCHIVES PED. & ADOLESCENT MED. 224, 225
(1997)):
The studies imply that transsexualism may be more similar to other physiological
conditions of sexual ambiguity, such as androgen insensitivity syndrome, than to
purely psychological disorders. Reiner posits:
"What can be stated is that the absence of prenatal androgen exposure,
whether a child is XX, XO, has androgen insensitivity syndrome, and so
on, may render the brain to the default, or female, position. Within the
potential for transformation from the default brain to the virilized brain is
the opportunity for errors of incomplete or improperly timed androgen
exposure. Such errors, in addition to acquired, sometimes iatrogenic, post-
natal injuries... may lead to the misassignment or reassignment of sex at
birth from the genetic sex."
See also In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1093 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (citing brain studies
showing the neurobiological basis for gender identity disorders), rev'd in part, 42 P.3d 120
(Kan.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002). Cf. COLAPINTO, supra note 22, at 44-45 (describing
Diamond's theories of prenatal hormones and gender identity); id. at 66, 134 (describing
Money's views of prenatal hormones and gender identity). On theories about prenatal hormone
exposure and sexual behavior, see FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 213-14, 218, 227-28.
On the role of genes in intersex conditions, see David T. MacLaughlin & Patricia K. Donahoe,
Sex Determination and Differentiation, 350 N. ENG. J. MED. 367 (2004).
132. See BUTLER, BODIES THATMATrER, supra note 103, at 104 ("a lack... designates
absently the domain of the feminine); DREGER, supra note 30, at 34, 68-69 (describing females
as underdeveloped males), 184 (vaginas as the absence of something); FAUSTO-STERLING, supra
note 11, at 203 ("longstanding notion that femaleness represented a bodily absence, while a
physical presence defined maleness"); Irigaray, supra note 58, at 251 ("[Woman's] sexual
organ, which is not one organ, is counted as none. The negative, the underside, the reverse of
the only visible and morphologically designatable organ.., the penis.").
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How can we avoid recalling here Freud's penis envy' 33 or, to invoke a different
hierarchy, the racial purity required of whites under the old "one-drop" rule?
134
This alternative interpretation, reflecting male superiority, seems to animate
standard medical protocols for children born with ambiguous genitalia. Even those who
are born chromosomal males will be assigned a female label if they lack genitalia
deemed adequate for a socially acceptable penis. Indeed, Suzanne Kessler unmasks
John Money's focus on genitalia, notwithstanding the use of his theory by social
constructionists. 35 In other words, for all the emphasis that Money placed on "gender
plasticity,"'136 he recommended female assignments only for males deemed to have
inadequate penises. To make this point less abstractly, note that Money did not
recommend reassignment for twin Brian Reimer, whose penis remained intact.
For males with ambiguous genitalia, as Alice Domurat Dreger explains:
[S]urgeons refashion phalluses to look like clitorises (or at least to be invisible
when the individual is standing), build vulvas and vaginas if necessary, and
remove any testes. This is done even if it means risking a child's only real chance
at becoming a biological parent, because intersex doctors consider "adequate"
penises [at least 2.5 centimeters when stretched] far more important for boys than
potential fertility. These children often also receive "feminizing" hormonal
supplements and later breast implants to accentuate feminine development .... 137
Dreger continues with a description of the standard medical practice in the mirror-
image case:
Meanwhile, genetic females (that is, babies lacking a Y chromosome) born with
ambiguous genitalia are declared girls-no matter how masculine their genitalia
look. This is done chiefly in the interest of preserving these children's feminine
reproductive capabilities and in bringing their anatomical appearance and
physiological capabilities into line with that reproductive role. Consequently,
these children are reconstructed to look female using the same general techniques
as those used on genetic-XY children assigned a female role. Surgeons reduce
"enlarged clitorises".. . so that they will not look or act "masculine." Vaginas are
built or lengthened if necessary, in order to make them big enough to accept
133. See, e.g., NANCY J. CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 52-53,
108 (1989) (summarizing Freud on penis envy); see also BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER, supra
note 103, at 200 (quoting Freud on penis envy).
134. See, e.g., HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN
BLACKS AND WHITES 74 (1995); IAN F. HANEY-L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAw: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 118 (1996). Cf Franke, supra note 103, at 26-29 (comparing race and
sex differentiation).
135. KESSLER, supra note 24, at 25. But see supra note 120 (quoting Fausto-Sterling).
136. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
137. DREGER, supra note 30, at 182; see also FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 57;
KESSLER, supra note 24, at 20, 27, 37 (quoting physicians and describing their assumptions); cf.
PREVES, supra note at 4, at 139 (reproducing the Intersex Society of North America's ("ISNA")
"phall-o-meter"). But see DREGER, supra note 30, at 195 (reporting that two physicians disagree
with this practice). Only now are physicians beginning to gather data to evaluate the standard
interventions, and their findings raise grave doubts about the practices that Dreger describes. See
Reiner & Gearhart, supra note 69; see also Navarro, supra note 9, at 1.
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average-sized penises. Joined labia are separated, and various other surgical and
hormonal treatments are directed at producing a believable and, it is hoped, fertile
girl. Clitorises-meaning phalluses in children assigned female identities-are
considered too big if they exceed one centimeter (0.39 inches) in length .... 138
Although no doubt physicians find surgical reduction more easily accomplished
than surgical construction,' 39 still the underlying assumptions send a strong signal that
the "female default" does not reflect a female norm. To the contrary, while anyone
apparently can be a female, maleness remains an elite assignment reserved for those
who meet anatomical criteria specified by the medical profession.
14°
Law professor Julie A. Greenberg puts the point somewhat differently, citing such
medical practices to conclude that sex-no less than gender--can be viewed as a social
construct, not a biological fact: "[M]en are defined based upon their ability to penetrate
females and females are defined based upon their ability to procreate."' 4' Biologist
Anne Fausto-Sterling goes further: "Our bodies are too complex to provide clear-cut
answers about sexual difference."'
42
B. Equality Doctrine
Although the appropriate place for gender differences in both law and society
remains contested, the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence makes one point
undisputably clear: laws that rely on gender-based stereotypes presumptively violate
the Equal Protection Clause and related equality norms. Repeatedly, a majority of the
Court has condemned the use of such stereotypes. In doing so, the Court has
eviscerated the legitimacy of all gender roles.
Most recently, in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,143 the majority
upheld the application to the states of the remedial provisions of the Family and
Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), noting with approval how Congress enacted the statute
to address the states' reliance on "invalid gender stereotypes in the employment
context."' 144 With this understanding of the FMLA as an antidiscrimination measure,
the majority cited its own use of heightened scrutiny for gender classifications as a
parallel move; this standard of review disallows justifications for such classifications
based on "overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females."' 45 In particular, the Hibbs Court identified the
harmful workplace consequences of gender stereotyping for both women and men:
138. DREGER, supra note 30, at 182-83; see FAuSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 61;
Ford, supra note 68, at 470-74.
139. See DREGER, supra note 30, at 18, 183; KESSLER, supra note 24, at 50; PREvES,
supra note 4, at 56.
140. But see DREGER, supra note 30, at 117 (noting previous practice of treating
doubtful cases as males to prevent danger of giving "masked males" access to females).
141. Greenberg, supra note 109, at 272.
142. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 4; see id. at 3-6.
143. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
144. Id. at 730; see id. at 728 ("The FMLA aims to protect the right to be free from
gender-based discrimination in the workplace.").
145. Id. at 729 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
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diminished chances for success in employment for the former and rare opportunities
for family leaves for the latter.' 6
The Court previously invoked this general approach to invalidate numerous specific
gender-based stereotypes that traditional family law followed. For example, using this
anti-stereotyping analysis, the Court found equal protection violations in rules that
specified who might need alimony (former wives only),1 47 who needs education and
training to perform the provider role (young men only),148 who can manage community
property (husbands only), 149 and who will be caring for a child after the other parent
dies (mothers only).' 50 Although male plaintiffs prevailed in many of these
challenges, 15 1 overall this line of cases worked to dismantle a caste system that had
relegated women to a secondary status in society.' 
2
As these cases demonstrate, the Court has pushed its anti-stereotyping analysis into
family law, the realm in which gender-based role assignments have perhaps remained
most deeply entrenched. 53 Developments in state and federal statutes and case law
have followed suit, as we can see in the emergence of gender-neutral rules about child
custody, 154 post-dissolution support,155 premarital contract enforcement, 156 and age
requirements for marriage, 157 to name just a few illustrations. Similarly, the American
Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations, the latest word in family-law reform, follows a gender-neutral
146. Id. at 736.
147. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
148. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); see Jessie Bernard, The Good-Provider
Role: Its Rise and Fall, 36 AM. PSYCHOL. 2 (Jan. 1981).
149. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
150. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
151. See Orr, 440 U.S. at 271; Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. at 638, Stanley; 405 U.S. at 657;
see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (challenging successfully the
constitutionality of an all-women's nursing school); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(challenging successfully the constitutionality of a higher drinking age for males than for
females).
152. Cf., e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as
Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 147 (1988); Valdes, supra note 11, at 266-67.
Blackstone's Commentaries provides one often-cited source documenting the subordinated
status of married women. 1 Wmim BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
153. The Court has accomplished this change in family law even while eschewing strict
scrutiny of gender classifications in favor of the less demanding and less predictable
intermediate scrutiny. See generally Lee Epstein et al., Constitutional Sex Discrimination, 1
TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 11 (2004), available at http://www.law.utk.edu/students/tjlp/tjlphome.htin.
154. See, e.g., Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981); Mo. REv. STAT. §
452.375 (2003).
155. See generally, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An
Overview of Women's Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth
Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017 (2000).
156. See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
157. See, e.g., UNIE. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 203, 9A U.L.A. 180 (1998).
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approach in proposing how legal decisionmakers should treat the consequences of
family breakups in the absence of agreement by the parties.1
58
According to the Supreme Court's approach, only a narrow band for departures
from gender neutrality exists; these exceptions cover only those cases in which men
and women are not similarly situated, based on "real differences."' 59 Yet as the FMLA
itself indicates, today lawmakers might choose a gender-neutral scheme even when sex-
based biological differences (as distinguished from stereotypical notions)' 60 would
permit an exception. In the FMLA context, for example, Congress might well have
rationalized that pregnancy and childbirth, which give rise to the need of some female
employees (but no male employees) for a specific type of leave, demand additional
protection, beyond that offered for other leaves needed by male and female employees
alike.' 6' Nonetheless, Congress enacted a gender-neutral leave law, explaining the
policy reason for this choice-fighting discrimination-in the statute itself.
162
C. Same-Sex Marriage
1. Applying Anti-Stereotyping Analysis
Although the Supreme Court has overturned almost all rules prescribing different
family responsibilities and expectations for wives and husbands, and mothers and
fathers, only a few judges have explicitly considered the ultimate conclusion of this
anti -stereotyping analysis: whether it undermines the requirement of a man and a
woman for a valid marriage.163 In other words, if both males and females alike must be
free to assume the various family roles, then what is the rationale for requiring one man
and one woman for a valid marriage?
158. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINcIPLES OF THE LAW OFFAMILY DissoLuTIoN 12,
24 (2002).
159. Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (stating that the Court
upholds gender classifications that "realistically reflect[] the fact that the sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances"); see, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Cal. Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); see also
Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns": Constitutional Sex Discrimination
Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1447 (2000); cf. David B. Cruz,
Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REv. 997, 1002 (2002) (exploring the Court's
ongoing use of "real differences" doctrine).
160. Lawmakers do not always see the distinction. See Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and
the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 987-1002 (1984); see also Franke, supra note 103, at
29-30, 81-82.
161. Cf. Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. 272 (upholding against sex-discrimination challenge a
statute providing unpaid pregnancy disability leave and reinstatement).
162.29 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2000).
163. Of course, the Supreme Court itself has not directly considered this issue although
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), contains relevant dicta, with both the majority and
concurring Justice O'Connor stating that their respective due process and equal protection
rationales for invalidating criminal same-sex sodomy statutes do not reach the marriage issue
and Justice Scalia condemning this new precedent for supporting a right to same-sex marriage.
See id. at 578 (majority opinion); id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 590, 599-600
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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This question follows so ineluctably from the Supreme Court's gender-equality
jurisprudence that one can wonder with well-founded surprise why this question has
played such an insignificant part in the otherwise expansive same-sex marriage
debate.'64 Yet, certainly the requirement rests on stereotypes (whether such stereotypes
are invoked to define marriage or assume its purpose) that limit the role of wife to
women and that of husband to men-and in so doing perpetuate the gender hierarchy
that the Supreme Court's anti-stereotyping analysis has sought to undo. Sylvia Law'
65
and Andrew Koppelman I 6 have elegantly developed this line of reasoning, which
others have examined as well. 1
67
Notwithstanding the stunning victory for challengers of the male-female marriage
requirement in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health 68 and their qualified success in the highest courts in
Hawaii' 69 and Vermont,170 only one judge (on the Vermont court) fully articulates this
164. See generally Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender
Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. __ (2005) (forthcoming).
165. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 187 (1988).
166. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
LAW 53-71 (2002) [hereinafter KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGrrs QUESTION]; Andrew Koppelman,
Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv.
197 (1994) [hereinafter Koppelman, Why Discrimination]; Koppelman, supra note 152. In
focusing on sex discrimination, Koppelman and Law revived an argument that some activists
had advanced much earlier. KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION, supra, at 54, 169 n.4.
167. E.g., John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 1119 (1999); Sandi Farrell, Reconsidering the Gender-Equality Perspective
for Understanding LGBT Rights, 13 LAw & SExuALrrY 605 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein,
Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1 (1994); see also Anita Bernstein, For and
Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 193 (2003) ("the state should not craft
its law of marriage to force individuals into a gender script-for instance, decreeing that a man
may marry only a woman and a woman may marry only a man"); Case, supra note 159, at 1486-
90; Amelia A. Craig, Musing About Discrimination Based on Sex and Sexual Orientation as
"Gender Role" Discrimination, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 105 (1995); Eskridge,
supra note 116, at 341; Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling,
Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 511,515, 617-26(1992).
168. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). The majority determined that excluding from civil
marriage and its benefits those who choose same-sex spouses violates the state constitution's
guarantees of liberty and equality, because the exclusion lacks a rational basis. The court left
room for more restrictive understandings of marriage under religious doctrines and practices. Id.
at 965 n.29.
169. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion). The plurality saw
the restriction as sex-based on its face because a marriage-license applicant's sex and the sex of
the prospective spouse determine their eligibility. I deem the case a "qualified success" because
the court remanded the case so that the state could attempt to establish a compelling state
interest, as required by the state constitution's equal rights amendment. See Baehr v. Miike, 994
P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (appeal after remand). The case triggered a public referendum that
produced a constitutional amendment authorizing the legislature to limit marriage to a man and
a woman, however, and the legislature did just that. See Haw. Const. art. I, § 23. The earlier
decision was then reversed as moot. Baehr v. Miike, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391.
20051
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
anti-stereotyping analysis 17 1 and one other (concurring in Goodridge) uses it.' 72 This is
so even though the United States Supreme Court's invalidation of antimiscegenation
laws in Loving v. Virginia173 provides a useful template for this approach; 7the first of
the recent state cases, Baehr v. Lewin from Hawaii, explicitly relied on a facial sex
discrimination rationale;'75 and Massachusetts's constitution, like Hawaii's, expressly
prohibits sex discrimination.1
7 6
Yet, a closer look reveals a more sophisticated and nuanced version of the anti-
stereotyping analysis in some of these recent developments. 177 In effect, the Vermont
case, Baker v. State, recognizes that the traditional restriction on marrying
discriminates against gays and lesbians as a class by denying them the equal access to
marriage's benefits promised by the state constitution's Common Benefits Clause.'"
Similarly, the Goodridge majority pointedly acknowledges the second-class status that
the marriage restriction (even if ameliorated by access to civil unions) imposes on gays
and lesbians. 79 And in Lawrence v. Texas, 80 the United States Supreme Court's
170. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 1 deem this case a "qualified success"
because it authorized civil unions, rather than access to full marriage, as a remedy for the
discrimination.
171. Id. at 906-07 & n. 1I (Johnson, J., dissenting in part). Justice Johnson sees the
issue as one of sex discrimination on its face and goes on to emphasize stereotypical gender
roles. But see id. at 880 n.13 (majority rejects this analysis because of the absence of purposeful
sex and gender-role discrimination).
172. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 973 (Greaney, J., concurring) (noting that this case
requires confronting "ingrained assumptions with respect to historically accepted roles of men
and women within the institution of marriage"). Justice Greaney sees the issue as one of sex
discrimination on its face.
173. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
174. In particular, Loving rejected the state's claim that there was no discrimination
because blacks and whites alike were prohibited from marrying across racial lines. The Court
first condemned the racial classification itself as a violation of equal protection. Id. at 8-9. The
Loving Court then went on to consider the law's illegitimate purpose, the maintenance of white
supremacy. Id. at 11; see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (noting that
racial classifications themselves are suspect and must meet highest scrutiny, even if they apply
equally). For a full analysis of how Loving's reasoning applies to prohibitions on same-sex
marriage, see KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION, supra note 166, at 53-71 and
Koppelman, supra note 152.
The analogy becomes even more compelling when considered against one popular
nineteenth-century rationale for enslaving African-Americans. Asserting slaves' natural
inferiority, slavery's supporters invoked the analogous situation of women, whom "God and
nature intended ... to be [men's] subordinates in marriage." NANCY F. COTT, PUBUC Vows: A
HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 61 (2002).
175. 852 P.2d at 59-67.
176. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 951 n.8.
177. For a review of the pre-Lawrence and pre-Goodridge challenges and developments
in this country and abroad, see generally Developments in the Law-The Law of Marriage and
Family, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1996, 2004-27 (2003).
178. See generally 744 A.2d 864.
179. 798 N.E.2d at 958, 961 n.21, 968 (noting discrimination or prejudice based on
sexual orientation). Goodridge's sequel, the Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, goes further
when it rejects civil unions as a remedy, emphasizing the inequality of a separate status for
same-sex couples. See 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004).
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critique of the stigma, discrimination, and demeaning effects of sodomy bans shows
sensitivity to the experiences of gays and lesbians.' 8' Although none of these cases
determines that gays and lesbians constitute a suspect class1 2 and Baker tolerates a
separate status for same-sex couples in authorizing civil unions, one can nonetheless
detect here an incipient gay-rights jurisprudence.'83 Likewise, opponents of the current
spate of proposed constitutional amendments to limit marriage to one man and one
woman emphasize the harms to gays and lesbians.'14 To the extent that choosing a male
intimate partner or spouse is simply one more traditional assumption about "the way
women are" and vice versa,' 85 the emerging recognition of gay rights helps undo yet
another gender stereotype.' 6
The most salient reasons emerging from judicial opinions rejecting calls for same-
sex marriage invoke procreation as the central purpose of marriage'87 and a definition
of marriage as a male-female relationship.'88 An additional argument has received
increasing emphasis lately, the argument that children need both a mother and a
father. 189 Goodridge succinctly replies to all of these. '90 More broadly, however, all
180. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
181. Id. at 575.
182. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961; Baker, 744 A.2d at 878 & n.10 (invoking
inclusive purpose of state constitution's Common Benefits Clause). The majority in Lawrence
declined to rely on equal protection at all, 539 U.S. at 575, and remained vague about the
standard of review applied. But see id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (determining that the
statute violates equal protection under any standard of review).
183. In addition, the concurring opinion in Baehr analyzes "sex" to include sexual
orientation. 852 P.2d at 68-71 (Bums, J., concurring).
184. See generally Appleton, supra note 164.
185. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996) (evaluating the relevance of
"typically male or typically female 'tendencies"').
186. Valdes would reject the purported distinctions among these approaches because, in
his view, sexual-orientation discrimination is always sex-based or gender-based discrimination.
See Valdes, supra note 11, at 17,204, 338; Koppelman, Why Discrimination, supra note 166, at
215. To the extent, then, that critics have said that to attack laws disadvantaging gays as sex
discrimination misses the central moral wrong of such laws, these critics seem to have
overlooked the gender stereotyping that privileging heterosexuality represents. See, e.g., Edward
Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 471, 498, 503 (2001). But see Hart, supra note 115, at 114 (advocating debate "framed in
terms of sexual orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination").
187. E.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995-96 (Cordy, J., dissenting); Baker v. Nelson,
191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971); see also Frank Bruni, Vatican Exhorts Legislators to
Reject Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at Al (reporting Vatican's statement that
the inability of same-sex couples to procreate on their own violates "one of the God-given and
most important aspects of marriage").
188. E.g., Standhardt v. Superior Ct., 77 P.3d 451,458 & n.10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003);
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191-92
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
189. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 1000 n.29 (Cordy, J., dissenting) ("This family
structure raises the prospect of children lacking any parent of their own gender. For example, a
boy raised by two lesbians as his parents has no male parent .... ); see also Lofton v. Sec'y of
Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819, 822-23 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (upholding
Florida law barring adoptions by gays and lesbians); Maggie Gallagher, What Marriage Is For,
in SAME SEX MARRIAGE PRO & CON: A READER 263, 269 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 2004)
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three justifications for excluding same-sex couples from marriage unravel when tested
under gender-equality doctrine.
The first reason, procreation, arguably resides in the safe haven for different
treatment that the Court has created for instances in which men and women are not
similarly situated. Yet as everyone knows, the narrow tailoring that equal protection
requires in gender cases cannot be satisfied, given frequent marriages among the
elderly, the infertile, the imprisoned,191 and the committed childless-by-choice, 192 as
well as the proliferation of assisted reproductive technologies, which allow same-sex
couples to procreate.193 In addition, even traditional rules that are rooted in biological
differences between men and women can have meaning for same-sex couples.
Consider, for example, Vermont's extension of the traditional presumption of
legitimacy for children born in marriage to children born in a civil union, 194 as well as
case law in California insisting on a gender-neutral application of paternity laws to
establish parentage in a mother's female partner.' 95
(condemning "unisex marriage" which "would mean that the law was neutral as to whether
children had mothers and fathers"). This argument was made repeatedly on the Senate floor by
those supporting the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment. See 150 CONG. REc. S8087-88
(daily ed. July 14,2004) (statement of Sen. McConnell); 150 CONG. REc. S7961 (daily ed. July
13, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hutchison); id. at S7966 (statement of Sen. Inhofe); id. at S7968
(statement of Sen. Ensign); id. at S7980, S8009-10, S8013-14 (statements of Sen. Santorum);
id. at S7997, S8011 (statements of Sen. Brownback); 150 CONG. REC. S7906-09 (daily ed. July
12, 2004) (statement of Sen. Santorum); id. at S7920-22 (statement of Sen. Cornyn); id. at
S7923-24 (statement of Sen. Lott).
190. The majority repudiates the contention that procreation is the essential purpose of
marriage. 798 N.E.2d at 962 (rejecting this reason because "it singles out the one unbridgeable
difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples and transforms that difference into the
essence of legal marriage"). The concurrence condemns the inadequacy of using the traditional
definition to decide the case. Id. at 972-73 (Greaney, J., concurring) (condemning reliance on
traditional definition as "conclusory" because it "bypasses the core question"). And, as far as
children's needs are concerned, the majority demonstrates how excluding from marriage and its
benefits families headed by same-sex couples unjustifiably punishes the children in these
families. Id. at 961-64.
191. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987) (recognizing constitutionally
protected attributes of marriage that survive incarceration).
192. See Koppelman, Why Discrimination, supra note 166, at 275-76.
193. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961-62 & nn.23-24. See generally, e.g., JOHN A.
ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEw REPRODUcTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
(1994); SILVER, supra note 45, at 206-22; Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families
through Surro-Gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER
& L. 183 (1995); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional
Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990).
194. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (2002). But see Opinions of the Justices, 802
N.E.2d 565, 577 n.3 (opinion of Justice Sosman).
195. Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 1045 (July 29, 2004), review
granted, opinion depublished by Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Anne R., 97 P.3d 72 (Cal. 2004).
The headline in a legal newspaper reporting the case proclaimed: "Calif. Court Breaks
Precedent, Says Woman Can Be Dad." Mike McKee, Calif. Court Breaks Precedent, Says
Woman Can Be Dad, THE RECORDER, July 1, 2004, at 1, available at LEXIS, Legal News
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The second reason, relying on the supposed definition of marriage, loses its force
now that modem equality principles have gender-neutralized the law's old stereotypical
expectations of husbands and wives in one aspect of family life after another. 6 Put
differently, the Court and other lawmakers have dismantled the old gendered family
rules one at a time. How can the whole be different from the sum of the parts?' 97
Hence, the male-female requirement not only seems at odds with the anti-
stereotyping analysis; t98 the requirement also becomes paradoxical because this very
same anti-stereotyping analysis deprives "wife" and "husband" of their traditional
gender-specific definitions. What does it mean to be a wife, as distinguished from a
husband, in today's era of gender-neutral family laws? A husband, as distinguished
from a wife? What substantive content does the law give to each such status or role,
now that the Court and other lawmakers have developed gender-neutral rules for
alimony, childcare, work outside the home, family leaves, and the like? Assuming that
marriage is here to stay (despite abolitionists' cogent critiques99), then allowing only
Publications. See also Susan E. Dalton, From Presumed Fathers to Lesbian Mothers: Sex
Discrimination and the Legal Construction of Parenthood, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 261 (2003).
196. As noted earlier, such changes go beyond those compelled by state or federal
constitutional equality guarantees to include legal rules (like the FMLA) that might have
included sex-specific provisions but do not. See supra notes 159-62. This is not to deny that
gender patterns in the family persist. See, e.g., Donald J. McNeil Jr., Real Men Don't Clean
Bathrooms, N.Y. TtMEs, Sept. 19, 2004, §4, at 3 (commenting on disproportionate amount of
family care work that women perform).
197. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 965 n.28 (rejecting understanding of mamage based
on "separate spheres"). From this perspective, then, one could say that same-sex marriage is "no
big deal" because the invalidity of laws prescribing gender roles for spouses amounts to the
same thing. See, e.g., Adam Haslett, Love Supreme: Gay Nuptials and the Making of Modern
Marriage, THE NEW YORKER, May 31, 2004, at 76; cf Eskridge, supra note 116, at 356
("Recognizing same-sex marriage would contribute to the erosion of gender-based hierarchy
within the family, because in a same-sex marriage there can be no division of labor according to
gender."); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 L. & SEXUALrrY 9
(1991); Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, Interdependence and
Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 312-14 (2000) (discussing how same-sex
marriage will make marriage "less sexist"); cf also Ginia Bellafante, Two Fathers, With One
Happy to Stay at Home, N.Y. TtMES, Jan. 12, 2004, at Al.
198. See Law, supra note 165, at 230-33.
199. For the negative consequences that follow from the state's privileging of marriage,
see, for example, MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY,
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay
Men Should Read Martha Fineman, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 167 (2000); Nancy D.
Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not
"Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993).
For a more upbeat look at the assumptions that marriage is here to stay and, overall, proves
beneficial, see, for example, Bernstein, supra note 167; Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No
Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27 (1996); David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal
Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 447 (1996). For the early debate in the gay rights community about whether to pursue
marriage access, compare Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry,
in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 398 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993), with Paula
Ettlebrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE
LAW 401 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993). See also, Peggy Pascoe, Sex, Gender, and Same-
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women to become wives and only men to become husbands must raise significant
equal protection questions.
200
Finally, these equal protection questions persist even if the focus shifts from gender
roles to gender-role models, the apparent agenda of those who oppose same-sex
marriage on the theory that children need a male and a female parent. The Court's
rejection of stereotypes challenges assumptions about the performance of gender itself.
Official expectations that males and females exhibit particular "tendencies'201 or
present themselves in a particularly masculine or feminine way ° contravene the
Court's vision of gender equality. Hence, the law cannot presuppose that children need
male and female models in order to grow up to be appropriately behaving males and
females themselves. Ironically, those who make this argument that every child needs a
mother and a father have allied themselves with feminists and others who emphasize
the social construction of gender (and hence see gender as nurture-based);20 3 after all, if
gender performance were "hard-wired" (or nature-based), then children would not need
such role models!
Once these asserted justifications crumble, then what can explain the persistence of
the male-female requirement even in the face of social change and legal challenge?
Two primary possibilities seem plausible yet ultimately remain unsatisfying:
homophobia and anatomy.2t3
To the extent that homophobia provides a reason for the male-female marriage
requirement, it indicates that some boundaries on the sexuality continuum still prevail.
Obviously, to cite fear and abhorrence of same-sex intimacy or of those who engage in
it to justify the requirement makes further analysis all but impossible. (That is not to
question the reality that homophobia exists; rather it means that homophobia is a
"conversation stopper." It does not allow for additional debate.) Nonetheless, one
might counter with the Supreme Court's language in Romer v. Evans,20 5 finding fatal
equal protection problems in classifications that impose disadvantages "born of
animosity. ' '2 06 The Court's more sweeping opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,2 0 7 calling for
Sex Marriage, in Is AcADEMic FEMINISM DEAD? THEORY IN PrACTIcE 86 (The Social Justice
Group at the Center for Advanced Feminist Studies, University of Minnesota eds., 2002)
200. To borrow an argument from Mary Anne Case, we could say that a wife's "job"
(being a "wife") will not be valued until it is open to men. See Case, supra note 103, at 3.
201. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996); see also Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982) (rejecting stereotype that only women should be
nurses).
202. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); cf. generally Case, supra
note 103.
203. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
204. One might imagine still other possible explanations. Perhaps the rule is designed to
ensure that women remain available to men. See, e.g., Koppelman, Why Discrimination, supra
note 166, at 247; cf. BERTRAND RUSSELL, MARRIAGE AND MORALS 17 (1929) ("the whole
conception of female virtue has been built up in order to make the patriarchal family possible").
Alternatively, the rule might have evolved so that women would tame male promiscuity. See,
e.g., BAILEY, supra note 9, at 89-90.'But then William Eskridge asks why gays shouldn't have
similar opportunities for being tamed. WuuAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: FROM SExuAL LIBERTY TO CrvILzED COMMITMENT 8-13 (1996).
205. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
206. Id. at 634.
207. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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respect for the private lives of gays and condemning sexual conduct crimes that
"demean [gays'] existence,, 208 sends a strong message against laws based on bare
homophobia. True, the Lawrence majority and concurring opinions steer clear of same-
sex marriage, in their emphases on privacy; 209 still, Justice Scalia and other critics note
the difficulty of maintaining such boundaries, especially when relying on equal
protection grounds, as Justice O'Connor's concurrence does.2 '0 Goodridge, decided
soon after Lawrence, amply fulfills this prophecy.2 1 Finally, the "model families"
represented by the well-chosen plaintiffs in Goodridge and similar challenges should
not be overlooked in the efforts to dislodge homophobia.
21 2
According to some scholars, homophobia is not an end in itself but a means of
preserving patriarchy and traditional gender roles.2 13 Yet, certainly the Supreme
Court's anti-stereotyping analysis and equality jurisprudence would doom this
rationale, if it were used to justify the male-female requirement for marriage.214 Justice
Scalia's dissent in Lawrence v. Texas misses this point in rejecting the analogy
208. Id. at 578.
209. See id.; id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Although marriage entails an
intimate, private choice, it also entails state recognition. See Earl M. Maltz, Constitutional
Protection for the Right to Marry: A Dissenting View, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 949 (1992); see
also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954 & 957 n. 14. But cf Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common
Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEo. L.J. 1829 (1987) (examining
de facto approach to marriage).
210. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599-601 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211. 798 N.E.2d at 948, 953,958 n. 17,959 (all citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003)); id. at 962 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 633); see also Opinions of the Justices, 802
N.E.2d 565. Massachusetts has an Equal Rights Amendment, but the Goodridge majority
(unlike the concurrence) does not explicitly treat the issue as one of sex-based discrimination.
See supra notes 168, 176.
212. For example, consider recent litigation in Washington state. According to news
reports, a trial judge praised the plaintiffs in striking down that state's male-female marriage
requirement:
In a ruling that gay couples can marry under Washington state law, King
County Superior Court Judge William Downing described the sixteen plaintiffs as
the kind of people "any of us should be proud to call a friend or neighbor or to sit
with at small desks on back-to-school night."
Downing wrote: "(Their) lives reflect hard work, professional achievement,
religious faith and the willingness to stand up for their beliefs. They are law-
abiding, taxpaying model citizens. They include exemplary parents, adoptive
parents, foster parents and grandparents.
"'They know what it means to make a commitment and to honor it."
Ruling Lauds "Model Citizens," Gay Marriage Ruling, 8 Couples Who Sued, Judge Says
Plaintiffs Know What Making a Commitment Means, SEATTLE TiMEs, Aug. 5, 2004, at A14,
available at LEXIS, News Library, SEATIM File (alteration in original); see also Toni
Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REv. 45, 102-08 (1996) (urging "calls to
empathy" based on narratives about gays' lives).
213. E.g., Law, supra note 165, at 219-21.
214. See Koppelman, Why Discrimination, supra note 166, at 254 ("Homosexuality is a
threat to the family only if the survival of the family requires that men and women follow
traditional sex roles.").
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between antimiscegenation laws and same-sex sodomy bans.215 Although he discerns
(and criticizes) the white supremacy animating the former, he fails to recognize the
gender hierarchy underlying the latter.
216
Alternatively, some would reject the term "homophobia," as I have used it in the
preceding paragraphs, in favor of "morality." They would say that accepted, traditional
moral teachings, reinforced by religious doctrine, explain the male-female requirement
for marriage. 21 7 Yet any asserted difference between homophobia and moral
disapproval is becoming so elusive that one might read Justice O'Connor to regard
these two as indistinguishable.2 8 Although morality played a decisive role in Bowers v.
Hardwick219 and Justice Kennedy in dissent invoked morality to defend the
constitutionality of the ban on particular abortion procedures invalidated in Stenberg v.
Carhart, 2 2 his majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas unmistakably signals the limits
of morality-based justifications. In protecting consensual same-sex intimacy in private
from state intrusion, Kennedy's opinion for the Lawrence majority concludes that the
sodomy ban "furthers no legitimate state interest., 221 Although the opinion studiously
avoids identifying the applicable standard of review,22 2 the Court's precedents use
strict223 or heightened224 scrutiny to review marriage restrictions. 225 Whatever the
215. 539 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS
QUESTION, supra note 166, at 62-63, 70.
216. See KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION, supra note 166; Law, supra note
165; see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring) (describing
discrimination here as similar to, but more subtle than, that in antimiscegenation cases).
217. See, e.g., Bruni, supra note 187 (noting that the Vatican calls laws recognizing
same-sex couples "gravely immoral"); Neil A. Lewis, Bush Backs Bid to Block Gays from
Marrying: Favors Legal Definition Specifying Both Sexes, N.Y. TiMES, July 31, 2003, at AI;
Letter to Bishops, supra note 97. Eskridge has written that, at this particular time in history, we
cannot help "moralizing about homosexuality"--whether in favor of the traditional disapproval
of gays and lesbians or in opposition to that tradition. See Eskridge, supra note 116, at 368-75.
218. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("A law branding one class
of persons as criminal solely based on the State's moral disapproval of that class and the
conduct associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause, under any standard of review."). See generally Barbara J. Flagg, "Animus"
and Moral Disapproval: A Comment on Romer v. Evans, 82 MINN. L. REv. 833 (1998).
219. 418 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, the majority applied the rational basis test to
reject a privacy challenge to Georgia's enforcement of its sodomy prohibition against a male
couple, on the ground that morality provided a legitimate justification for the ban. Id. at 195-96.
220. 530 U.S. 914, 962-64 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
221. 539 U.S. at 558 ("The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.").
222. Cf id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (applying the "searching form" of rational
basis review under Equal Protection Clause); id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (critiquing the
result of rational basis review detected in the majority opinion).
223. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating antimiscegenation
restrictions on marriage, which is a fundamental right).
224. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (noting that significant
interference with the right to marry requires sufficiently important state interests and narrow
tailoring).
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standard used in Lawrence, one could argue that the standard applied to the male-
female marriage requirement should be at least as demanding, if not more
226demanding.
The second arguably irreducible reason for the "opposite-sex" marriage requirement
relies on male and female genital anatomy per se (without reference to reproductive
capacities 227). In other words, a penis is a bona fide occupational qualification
("BFOQ") for husbands, and a vagina is for wives. 22 This premise appears to underlie
the religious argument that marriage requires "gender complementarity. ' ' 229 Certainly,
this argument would avoid the problem of relying on unconstitutional gender-based
role assignments, given that, anatomically, males and females are not similarly situated.
Yet, discerning whether this is a free-standing argument or a disguised version of the
response based on homophobia, with or without the morality gloss, remains elusive.
Precisely why must marriage require one anatomical male and one anatomical female?
Anatomy provides a peculiar criterion for a public event such as marriage2 1 because
anatomy is ordinarily not a sexual cue visible for public inspection; rather, we infer
225. Admittedly, such reasoning begs the question whether, by definition, marriage
refers only to the union of male-female couples. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying
text.
226. A court might invoke the claim for state recognition that marriage entails to apply a
lower standard of review to the male-female marriage requirement than to same-sex sodomy
crimes. Lawrence could be read to suggest this approach, given the way the majority
distinguishes private sexual conduct from cases involving "whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." 539 U.S. at 578.
Such reasoning might follow that used to support a lower standard of review for denials of
abortion funding (rational basis) than for criminal restrictions on abortion (strict scrutiny).
Compare Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Further, challengers in the abortion-funding cases claimed discrimination because the state
provided subsidies for indigent women seeking to carry their pregnancies to term, just as
challengers of the male-female requirement for marriage would certainly claim discrimination.
Then, of course, there is the possibility that the Court might split the difference or develop a
new standard of review, such as the undue burden standard, as three Justices did in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion). Later,
a majority adopted the undue burden standard to review abortion restrictions. Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000).
227. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
228. A BFOQ is a defense to sex-discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000) (exempting from the prohibition on employment
discrimination situations in which sex "is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of [the] particular business or enterprise"). See Case, supra
note 159, at 1489 (considering whether capacity for vaginal intercourse constitutes prerequisite
to marriage); Valdes, supra note 11, at 328 (discussing "'authentic' sex discrimination," based
on "a person's external genitalia, or, at most, some other biophysical aspect of the body that may
be deemed closely or substantially related to sex").
229. See, e.g., JOHN PIPER, A Vision of Biblical Complementarity, in RECOVERING
BIBLICAL MANHOOD AND WOMANHOOD: A RESPONSE TO EvANGEUCAL FEMINISM (Wayne Gruden
& John Piper, eds.), available at http://leaderu.com/orgs/cbmw/rbmw. The complementarity
argument is rooted in, but not limited to, anatomy. John Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual
Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1066-67 (1994); see also Cruz, supra note 159, at
1079.
230. See generally Conr, supra note 174.
2005]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
whether an individual is male or female based on secondary sex characteristics
(including body type and the presence or absence of facial hair), behavior, name,
adherence to customary norms of appearance (including hairstyle and clothing), and
other performative acts.23 ' Moreover, as those who have plastic surgery and sex-
reassignment procedures illustrate, anatomy is not a constant.232
Yet penises and vaginas do make heterosexual penetration possible, which critics
claim has become the hierarchy-enforcing essence of the current understanding of
marriage.233 Further, the minority approach to transsexuals' ability to enter into a valid
marriage seems to support a justification based on male and female anatomy. A New
Jersey case, which exemplifies this approach, M.T. v. J.T.,234 upheld a marriage
between a male and a post-surgical male-to-female transsexual, based on the latter's
anatomical capacity to function sexually as a female. The court noted that medical
treatment had harmonized the transsexual's genitalia with her gender, so that she had
"become physically and psychologically unified and fully capable of sexual activity
consistent with her reconciled sexual attributes of gender and anatomy."'235 This
reasoning also comports with traditional legal rules allowing annulment when one party
is physically unable to consummate a marriage.236 In addition, the treatment of males
with "inadequate" penises and the assignment of a female gender to them suggest the
importance of certain anatomical attributes.
237
On the other hand, a majority of courts faced with issues like that posed in M. T. has
held that anatomy-at least when medically constructed-remains insufficient to
change an individual's legal sex for purposes of the male-female requirement for
238marriage. Under these cases, although a transsexual with a surgically constructed
231. See PREVES, supra note 4, at 17; see also FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at
243-44. Children typically reach conclusions about sex classifications without realizing that
anatomy plays any role. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 247-48; see also Franke, supra
note 103, at 39 (discussing "cultural genitals" and gender stereotypes).
232. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 242-43.
233. See generally Sally F. Goldfarb, Family Law, Marriage, and Heterosexuality:
Questioning the Assumptions, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 285 (1998); see also
Koppelman, supra note 152, at 235 ("The central outrage of male sodomy is that a man is
reduced to the status of a woman, which is understood to be degrading."). Moreover, the leading
case for spelling out the equal protection rules that apply when there are "real differences"
between males and females concerned heterosexual penetration. Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450
U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding a California law that makes only males capable of statutory rape).
234. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
235. Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
236. E.g., D. v. D., 20 A.2d 139 (Del. 1941); Tompkins v. Tompkins, 111 A. 599 (N.J.
Ch. 1920).
237. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002) (see infra notes
252-59 and accompanying text); In re Application for a Marriage License for Jacob B. Nash
and Erin A. Barr, Nos. 2002-T-0149 and 2002-T-0179, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6513 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230-31 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 872 (2000); see also Bellinger v. Bellinger, 2 A.C. 467 (H.L. 2003) (recognizing conflict
with European Convention on Human Rights). Commentators have referred to outcomes like
those in the cited cases as the majority view. E.g., Berrigan, supra note 109, at 88; Anthony S.
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vagina may have female anatomy, the law will not recognize her as female for purposes
of marriage. Courts have not yet addressed what this rule means for intersexed
individuals, given their often surgically fashioned genitalia. Further, Suzanne Kessler
has observed that in some situations sexual activity helps make anatomy possible,
rather than vice versa.
239
In any event, both of these tacks, homophobia and anatomy, have vulnerabilities. To
the extent that homophobia is at work, recent developments prevent the conclusion that
change cannot occur--or that it always requires slow, incremental steps.
Notwithstanding the calls for a federal constitutional amendment?4° and similar efforts
at the state level,24' consider the breathtaking speed with which we have witnessed
Vermont's civil unions;242 Ontario, Canada's same-sex marriages; 43 the remarkable
rulings in Lawrence and Goodridge; San Francisco's sudden flurry of marriage
licenses (whatever their validity) issued over Valentine's Day weekend of 2004; 244 and
the celebration of unquestionably valid same-sex marriages in Massachusetts,
Winer, Assimilation, Resistance, and Recent Transsexual Marriage Cases, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR
Soc. JUST. 653, 661-64 (2003).
239. She writes how transsexuals who have surgically constructed vaginas receive
instructions to engage in sexual intercourse to maintain the opening. KESSLER, supra note 24, at
108. Intersexed individuals who have vaginoplasty also must follow regular dilation exercises.
See PREvES, supra note 4, at 78-79.
240. See President George W. Bush, Remarks of the President, President Calls for
Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004), transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html. The Senate considered a
proposed constitutional amendment, S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (2004). After three days of
debate, the Senate voted fifty to forty-eight against moving forward with the proposal. See Carle
Hulse, Senators Block Initiative to Ban Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2004, at Al;
Senate Roll-Call Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2004, at At9.
241. A 2004 compilation listed Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
Oklahoma, and Utah as states with constitutional same-sex marriage bans on the ballot for that
year and Arkansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, and Oregon as
states with petitions filed to put such measures on the ballot. Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown
on Gay Marriage Laws, at
http://www.stateline.org/stateline?pa=story&sa=showStorylnfo&id=353058 (last updated Aug.
26, 2004). In all, lawmakers in twenty-five states have introduced proposed constitutional
amendments, and "[a]ll would require a statewide vote." Id. On August 3, 2004, 71% of those
casting ballots voted in favor of adding the following language to the Missouri Constitution:
"That to be valid and recognized in this state, a marriage shall exist only between a man and a
woman." See Matthew Franck, Foes of Gay Marriage Hope Vote Is Catalyst, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 5, 2004, at Al. On November 2, 2004, constitutional amendments baring
same-sex marriage passed in all eleven states where they appeared on the ballot. See, e.g.,
James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P. Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,2004, at
P4.
242. VT. STAT ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-06 (2003).
243. Halpern v. Canada, [2003] O.R.3d 161, 2003 Ont. Rep. LEXIS 153; see also
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79 (Can.) (upholding constitutionality of proposed
law authorizing same-sex marriage throughout Canada).
244. See Carolyn Marshall, Dozens of Gay Couples Marry in San Francisco
Ceremonies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A24. The California Supreme Court subsequently
invalidated the same-sex marriages celebrated in San Francisco. Lockyer v. City and County of
San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
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beginning on May 17, 2004.245 And all of these North American developments follow
earlier recognition of same-sex marriage in Belgium and the Netherlands.
2 46
Finally, both homophobia- and anatomy-based explanations for the "opposite-sex"
requirement presume clear delineation between males and females, which the medical
practices reviewed above call into question. Indeed, the analysis becomes maddeningly
circular when one recalls that, historically, homophobia provided a principal
justification for the need to determine conclusively the sex of every person247 and that a
child's anatomy (sometimes medically "corrected") typically dictates initial sex
assignment.2 48 Today, these difficulties have entered the legal consciousness through
several recent cases about transsexuals and marriage, explored below.
2. Transsexual Marriage as a "Wedge" Issue
A number of commentators recently have suggested that the male-female
requirement for marriage necessarily begins to disintegrate when applied to
transsexuals. The argument proceeds as follows, using as an example a post-surgical
male-to-female transsexual. The Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to
marry. 249 Many states will grant this transsexual an amended birth certificate, replacing
the original male designation with a female designation. With the amended certificate,
this individual cannot marry a female in any state but Massachusetts because of
prohibitions against same-sex marriage.2 50 Yet, the majority view expressed in
American case law also holds invalid marriages between such an individual and a male,
on the theory that sex is permanently determined at birth and cannot be altered by
medical intervention. Something has got to give to avoid depriving transsexuals of the
245. See Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Arrives at Moment for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 17, 2004 at A16 (describing celebrations as first same-sex marriage licenses were
issued in Massachusetts).
246. See Developments in the Law, supra note 177, at 2006-09.
247. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
248. In other words, does homophobia dictate sexual classification, or does sexual
classification "precede" homophobia? Does anatomy dictate sexual classification, or does sexual
classification dictate anatomy? Cf. KESSLER, supra note 24, at 53 (summarizing various
purposes of genitals, which parents and physicians use at child's birth to assign gender, which
adults often use for sexual pleasure and occasionally for reproduction, and which everyone uses
to urinate).
249. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 384-86 (1978). But it does not follow that the Constitution would prevent the abolition of
civil marriage. See Cain, supra note 199, at 31-43 (concluding that state could abolish marriage
so long as intimacy remained protected).
250. Even in Massachusetts only domiciliaries are eligible for same-sex marriage, a
limitation acknowledged in Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 967, but facing challenges. See Pam
Belluck, Eight Diverse Couples Join to Fight Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at
A22. By contrast, a number of U.S. citizens have traveled to Ontario to marry. See Clifford
Krauss, A Wedding in Canada: Gay Couples Follow a Trail North Blazed by Slaves and War
Resisters, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 23, 2003, § 4, at 7.
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right to marry altogether. 25 With this fracture in the male-female requirement, so the
argument goes, the ban on same-sex marriage ultimately will collapse.
Two recent cases highlight the transsexual's "Catch-22," While also summarizing
the current state of the law. The Supreme Court of Kansas's decision in In re Estate of
Gardiner5' provides a useful illustration of the majority view on marriage for
transsexuals.' 5' The court ruled invalid the marriage between the late Marshall
Gardiner, a male, and J'Noel Ball Gardiner, a post-surgical male-to-female transsexual,
in a challenge brought by Marshall's son to J'Noel's right to inherit a widow's share. 4
The court decided that the case turned on questions of law: the meanings of "sex,"
"male," and "female" in the marriage statute. The court inferred from the statute's
silence the legislative intent to use only the ordinary meanings of these terms, which do
not include transsexuals. 5 5 J'Noel remained a legal male256-a conclusion that
required the court to reject an amended Wisconsin birth certificate identifying J'Noel
as female, a Wisconsin driver's license with the same information, and a much more
nuanced consideration of sex and gender developed in the appellate court's opinion.
The appellate court, relying on recent medical and legal literature covering the many
different bases on which a determination of sex and gender might rest, had seen the
251. See, e.g., Berrigan, supra note 109, at 115; Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation:
Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 219,263-65 (1998);
Flynn, supra note 103, at 418; Katrina C. Rose, The Transsexual and the Damage Done: The
Fourth Court Opens PanDOMA 's Box by Closing the Door on Transsexuals'Right to Marry, 9
LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 4-5, 124-26 (1999-2000); Mark Strasser, Harvesting the Fruits of
Gardiner: On Marriage, Public Policy, and Fundamental Interests, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 179,
198-99 (2003). But see Phyllis R. Frye & Alyson D. Meiselman, Same-Sex Marriages Have
Existed Legally in the United States for a Long Time Now, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1031, 1035 (2001)
(asserting that advocates of same-sex marriage reject transgender marriages as "wedge issue").
252. 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
253. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
254. The court accepted evidence that Marshall knew of J'Noel's medical history before
the would-be marriage. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 122. Although some marriages like that of
Marshall and J'Noel might remain valid because they go unchallenged, the approach of the
Supreme Court of Kansas reflects the majority view among litigated and reported cases.
Moreover, the outcome in Gardiner makes the marriage void, not just voidable. Cf BOYLAN,
supra note 82, at 240 (claiming, as new male-to-female transsexual, author can remain married
to her wife, but all subsequent marriages must be with a man); Strasser, supra note 251, at 209-
11 (suggesting such marriages should be voidable, not void); Frye & Meiselman, supra note
251, at 1036-41 (noting existing same-sex marriages involving transgendered spouses).
255. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 138 ('The words 'sex,' 'male,' and 'female' in everyday
understanding do not encompass transsexuals."); see also id. at 136 (interpreting "'opposite sex'
in the narrow traditional sense").
256. Accord, In re Application for a Marriage License for Jacob B. Nash and Erin A.
Barr, Nos. 2002-T-0149 & 2002-T-0179, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6513 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003);
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223,231 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000).
But see Thomas W. Mayo, Sex, Marriage, Medicine, and Law: "What Hope of Harmony?, "42
WASHBuRN L.J. 269, 277 (2003) (suggesting that legislature might have assumed that post-
surgical transsexuals are covered by sex of reassignment); Strasser, supra note 251, at 198
(suggesting a transsexual might not fit either "male" or "female" under Gardinerand thus might
not be able to marry at all). Cf Kitchin, supra, note 82 (condemning classification as arbitrary,
hence unconstitutional).
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question of J'Noel's sex as one of fact.257 According to the appellate court, as many as
eight different factors might prove relevant for a determination of sex or gender,
8
which need not remained fixed from the time of birth. Thus, the appellate court would
have remanded the case for further factual development about J'Noel's particular
circumstances.
259
In another recent case, In re Heilig,260 the petitioner sought legal recognition of her
sex change, from male to female. The highest court in Maryland decided that:
... (1) gender itself is a fact that may be established by medical and other
evidence, (2) it may be, or possibly may become, other than what is recorded on
the person's birth certificate, and (3) a person has a deep personal, social, and
economic interest in having the official designation of his or her gender match
what, in fact, it always was or possibly has become.
26 1
The court accepted the arguments that no single test for gender controls 262 and that a
permanent and irreversible change from the sex originally assigned warrants legal
recognition. The opinion presents a thorough examination of the medical literature
about transsexuality, sexual ambiguity, and gender identity.263 Despite this open and
inclusive approach, however, the court expressly acknowledged the limited stakes:
Heilig's petition raised no question about marriage, and the court made clear it would
express no opinion on such issues.26 4 Indeed, while the majority of marriage cases
refuse to recognize sex changes, several states have statutes that authorize amendments
of birth certificates or drivers' licenses after a medically documented sex change.265
Together, cases like Gardiner and Heilig make the "wedge issue" argument
particularly forceful. After all, what is someone like J'Noel supposed to do about
marriage? Marry a male, only to have a court declare the marriage invalid as the
Supreme Court of Kansas did? Marry a female, only to violate the "opposite-sex"
requirement for any authorities that consider controlling the amended driver's license
or birth certificate? In fact, after a Texas court reached a result like that of the Kansas
Supreme Court,266 a number of same-sex couples successfully sought marriage
257. 22 P.3d 1086, 1110 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
258. See id. at 1094.
259. See id. at 1106-07, 1110. For critiques of the Kansas Court of Appeals's approach,
see Strasser, supra note 251, at 199-200; Winer, supra note 238, at 665-66.
260. 816 A.2d 68 (Md. 2003).
261. Id. at 79.
262. See id. at 73.
263. See In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 71-79 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
264. Id. at 85-86 n.9.
265. See Greenberg, supra note 109, 309-17 (discussing variations among jurisdictions
on changes of official documents); see also In re Guido, 771 N.Y.S.2d 789 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003)
(granting name change). This approach invites strategic decisions about whether a transsexual
should seek an amended birth certificate, depending upon the sex classification of a prospective
marriage partner. See Strasser, supra note 251, at 220-21.
266. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230-31 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 872 (2000).
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licenses, based on the fact that one prospective spouse had, before surgery, a different
sex assignment.
2 67
When the smoke clears, however, Gardiner demonstrates that the "wedge issue"
strategy does not succeed, and Heilig stops short of applying its more flexible view of
sex to marriage. Further, the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Goodridge268-together with the reality of same-sex marriage in the Netherlands,
Belgium, Ontario, 269 San Francisco, and now Massachusetts27-all indicate that, as a
legal strategy, this "wedge issue" is unnecessary. On the other hand, despite these
transformative developments, we have begun to see a steady parade of efforts to stop
same-sex marriage, including constitutional amendments and public referenda, which
seem to be attracting increasingly vocal and numerous proponents and naysayers.
271
Perhaps the most accurate conclusions, then, to draw from these mixed signals would
say that gender, gender identity, sex, sexuality, transsexuality, and marriage are all
receiving new scrutiny,272 with the pace of change acquiring remarkable speed and
momentum, and that this transition-fitful as it may be-will surely continue.
D. Revisiting Middlesex: Enter the Intersexed Protagonist
Although the "wedge issue" argument has not succeeded as a legal strategy, its
premise deserves additional exploration. At bottom, this argument invokes transsexuals
like J'Noel to challenge an absolute male-female dichotomy and a marriage regime
built on these classifications. In other words, the traditional rules of marriage rely on
sex and gender categories that transsexuals like J'Noel arguably unsettle and defy-
creating a wedge in our assumptions and confounding how we think about such
matters. Now that members of the general public are participating in the debate about
same-sex marriage through ballot initiatives and referenda,2 73 situations like J'Noel's
acquire new significance because of their impact on popular understanding. In
particular, such situations help reveal that the fundamental question in the marriage
debate concerns the inevitability of gender categories.Y
Yet on closer inspection, the promise of this particular approach, focusing on
transsexuals, is oversold--even as a way of challenging popular conceptions of sex,
267. See, e.g., Frye & Meiselman, supra note 251; PREVES, supra note 4, at 38; Lesbian
Couple Get Marriage License, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESs-NEws, June 12, 2001, at 2B.
268. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
269. Halpern v. Canada, [2003] O.R.3d 161, 2003 Ont. Rep. LEXIS 153; see also, e.g.,
Clifford Krauss, Canadian Leaders Agree to Propose Gay Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
2003, at Al. The constitutionality of the proposed law was upheld in Reference re Same-Sex
Marriage, 2004 SCC 79 (Can.).
270. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text; see generally Appleton, supra
note 164.
272. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 177.
273. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
274. The Catholic Church seems to have recognized this point. See Letter to Bishops,
supra note 97. See also BUTLER, supra note 32, at 217 (transgender enters into the political
field "by not only making us question what is real, and what has to be, but by showing us how
contemporary notions of reality can be questioned, and new modes of reality instituted").
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gender, and marriage. After all, J'Noel and the court that decided her case accept the
validity of the male-female dichotomy, of gender classifications, and of the current
marriage regime; they simply disagree about the category in which J'Noel belongs. The
gender dysphoria that started J'Noel on her "journey"275 caused her to identify herself
as a female in a male's body, 276 communicating her acceptance of a binary view of sex
and implicitly a male-female requirement for marriage.277 Despite medical literature
and legal authority that recognize sex reassignment surgery as medically necessary
treatment 27s even though the patient's body appears healthy and "normal," skeptics like
the majority-view courts continue to resist the conclusion that sex-reassignment surgery
results in a "real" change of sex for purposes of marriage.279 In short, using the lens of
transsexuality to expose the limits of both traditional gender categories and existing
marriage rules will neither clarify everyone's vision nor present the most effective
challenge to what Taylor Flynn calls the "sex system."
280
Although J'Noel's predicament is real, Cal's fictional story is far more compelling.
Perhaps it provides a way to open, if not change, hearts and minds. We know the
power of narrative to sharpen and deepen our understanding of the law. 28 l Fictional
narratives, like Cal's in Middlesex, can perform this role and arguably can do it better
than nonfictional accounts, 282 particularly when the extended relationship that the
275. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 122.
276. Id.; see also, e.g., DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, CROSSING: A MEMOIR (1999); cf.
supra note 113 (summarizing Bailey's controversial distinction between homosexual and
autogynephilic male-to-female transsexuals).
277. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 107 ("Winning the right to surgical and
legal sex changes, however, exacted a price: the reinforcement of a two-gender system.");
PREvES, supra note 4, at 46 ("[T]he example of traditional transsexualism.., is actually a
reinforcement of gender binarism."). On the other hand, consider the continuing relationships of
some male-to-female transsexuals and their wives. See e.g., BOYLAN, supra note 82.
278. See Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the "Nascent
Jurisprudence of Transsexualism," 4 MIcH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 281-84 (1997).
279. Still other skeptics cling to the conclusion that such surgery entails the removal or
modification of "healthy, undamaged organs and tissue." See id. at 284 (quoting Pinneke v.
Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 1980)). Of course, this conclusion is true, although there's
considerably more to the story than that. For a provocative comparison, see Carl Elliot, A New
Way to be Mad: Amputations Sought by Healthy People, ATE. MONTHLY, Dec. 1, 2000, at 73
(examining people who have had voluntary leg amputations as a result of "apotemnophilia"-
the desire to be an amputee-and citing Dr. John Money as an authority on the subject).
280. Flynn, supra note 103, at 394.
281. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971
(1991); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice
of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV.
803 (1994); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989).
282. Creating fictional narrative to illuminate the law is not new. See, e.g., Derrick Bell,
The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARv. L. REv. 4
(1985) (chronicling the story of Geneva Crenshaw). In the case of Cal's story, however, it
probably was not created for the purpose of advancing legal analysis, although it serves the
objective nicely.
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reader develops with the protagonist (529 pages worth, here) not only suspends
disbelief but also evokes affection, concern, and empathy.
283
In addition, with fictional narrative, a skilled author can create precisely the right set
of facts, the perfect test case for destabilizing the mainstream reader's assumptions.
That is just what Eugenides has provided: while the case law (like the media coverage
of such litigation 28) has focused on questions raised by transsexuals and mostly
adhered to a fixed, dichotomous understanding of sex and gender, especially in
marriage cases, at least one judge has observed that courts and legislatures will be
unable to escape recognition of the limits of the traditional male-female dichotomy
when confronting challenges by intersexed individuals. Concurring in a Texas case that
follows the majority view to invalidate a male-to-female transsexual's marriage to a
male, Justice Angelini foresees the problem that this biology-based rule will pose for
"those individuals whose sex may be ambiguous." 285 Further, in those cases with
outcomes that depart from the traditional approach or majority view, the opinions often
consider in dicta the reality of intersexual existence.286 (Indeed, these opinions present
transsexualism as simply one type of ambiguity or incongruity, in which genitalia and
chromosomes diverge from sexual identity-similar to, for example, genitalia and
chromosomes that do not "match." 287) The story of Cal and his 5-alpha-reductase
deficiency syndrome brings such issues from the margins to center stage, while
avoiding some of the obstacles transsexuals have encountered.
The transformation of Cal's anatomy, without surgery, from baby girl to maturing
young man challenges us to reconsider what "female," "male," and "normal"
283. Cf. supra note 212 and accompanying text (noting how advocates of same-sex
marriage have found particularly sympathetic plaintiffs).
284. Feature stories about J'Noel and the lawsuit appeared in the popular press and on
television. E.g., Alex Tresniowski et. al., Split Heirs: Joe Gardiner Battles His Late Father's
Second Wife-Transsexual J'Noel Ball--Over His $2.7 Million Estate, PEOPLE, Aug. 28,2000,
at 75; Man Challenges Stepmother's Right to His Late Father's Estate, a Stepmother Who Used
to Be a Man (NBC Today Show, Jan. 24, 2004).
285. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 232 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (Angelini, J.,
concurring). She continues: "Having recognized this fact, I express no opinion as to how the law
would view such individuals with regard to marriage." id. Scholars, too, have recognized the
effective challenges that intersexed individuals might present. See KEsSLER, supra note 24, at
122 (explaining why "intersexuals are being embraced as the best representatives of
transgender"); Coombs, supra note 251, at 258-61; Greenberg, supra note 109; see also id. at
323-25 (examining an unsuccessful employment-discrimination case brought by an intersexed
worker).
286. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1094-1100 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001);
Heilig, 816 A.2d at 73-76; Berrigan, supra note 109, at 108 n.189, 109 n.197 (citing I. v.
United Kingdom, App. no. 25680/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 11, 2002)), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=0&Action=Html&X=211024628&Notice=
0&Noticemode=&RelatedMode--0.
287. Prenatal exposure to hormones might explain such gender dysphoria. See Heilig,
816 A.2d at 75-76; see also supra note 131 (quoting Reiner as quoted in Heilig); cf. supra note
25 (noting Money's recognition of behavioral influence of prenatal exposure to hormones).
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mean 2SS-in a way that is likely to draw in every reader. When Cal chooses to assume a
male identity, even the most rigid adherent of a dichotomous, either/or view of sex
cannot quarrel with the choice: after all, Cal has always been chromosomally and
physically male, even if his testicles are not externally visible. Certainly, it's difficult to
imagine that any reader would fail to react with empathy and support for Cal's
decision. Indeed, we cheer him on in his early, tentative steps to establish a romantic
relationship with a woman (perhaps leading to marriage?), 289 and I predict a rigid
"gender dichotomist"-someone who clings to a traditional, binary view of sex,
gender, and sexuality-would do so too.
Now suppose Eugenides had written a different ending for Middlesex: what if Cal
had decided to remain Callie, just as the parents had hoped and Dr. Luce had advised?
She would have had surgery and hormonal treatments in order to continue the life of a
female that she had been leading since birth. How would a rigid gender dichotomist
respond to this scenario? Would not this reader's empathy and support remain, even if
Callie then found herself in romantic relationships with men (again, just as the parents
and physician had hoped)? Is it clear for the gender dichotomist that only one choice-
a decision either to become Cal or to continue being Callie-is sound, while the other
is deviant?2"
Does all this mean that our hero could do no wrong, even in the eyes of a gender
dichotomist? Not necessarily, because the gender dichotomist, I imagine, does not
accept same-sex intimacy--or at least does not place it on a par with heterosexual
relationships. So suppose either Cal (as a newly identified male) or Callie (as a
continuing female) were gay, preferring as sexual partners members of the same sex,
either male or female, respectively? 29' In fact, Middlesex raises this question as teenage
Callie becomes sexually involved with both a female schoolmate (known only as the
Obscure Object of Desire) and also the Object's brother--episodes that prompt
Callie's sexual awakening and ultimate decision to live as a male. Does the gender
dichotomist condemn one of these relationships but not the other? Which one?
Speculations about the gender dichotomist's reactions might demonstrate the staying
power of homophobia, underscoring the emotional, even if irrational, hurdles it will
continue to pose for same-sex marriage. More powerfully, however, these speculations
necessarily raise questions about what we mean by a "same-sex" relationship for
someone like Callie or Cal. Only a clear delineation between male and female can
answer such questions, and yet history shows both that homophobic norms propelled
288. See also DREGER, supra note 30, at 189 (explaining that intersexed individuals
usually have no metabolic disease warranting surgery, but rather just fail "to fit one particular
definition of normality"); KESSLER, supra note 24, at 31 ("natural").
289. See EUGENIDES, supra note 1, at 514.
290. Indeed, intersexed individuals do marry. For example, Preves's book includes
interviews with Robin, a chromosomal male with AIS who appears female, was reared as a
female, and identifies as a female. The interviews portray her as happily married to a male. See
PREvEs, supra note 4, at 85, 112, 140.
291. For example, some transsexuals, after reassignment, find partners among members
of their "new" sex. See, e.g., supra note 267 and accompanying text (noting transsexual
marriages in Texas after Littleton); see also BuTLER, supra note 32, at 141-42 ("It becomes
difficult to say whether the sexuality of the transgendered person is homosexual or
heterosexual.").
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whatever delineation we use today292 and that the existence of a sure, "natural" basis
for the delineation remains a fiction. In the end, Cal seems content to sidestep these
questions, emerging as a straight male-albeit one with an extraordinary body, an
unusual although not unhappy childhood, and an expanded perspective. 293 Of course,
this outcome means that Cal leaves us wondering whether he would have won over or
alienated the gender dichotomist if he had taken an even bolder step: refusing
altogether classification as male or female.
2 94
Once again, Middlesex-true to its name-enlightens by eschewing extreme
positions in favor of complex fusions that stake out a middle ground. Just as Cal shows
us, for example, that both nature and nurture play important roles in establishing
identity,295 here Cal both reinforces the gender hierarchy (by his choice to live as a
straight male) and challenges rigid gender categories (by his "stereoscopic" way of
looking at the world). Perhaps the rationale for male-female marriage requirements
should no longer withstand careful examination, but being a straight male still beats the
alternatives, 296 Cal's example seems to teach.
So, too, Cal straddles the divide that seems to distinguish destiny from desire.
Readers might feel tempted to empathize with Cal, regardless of the way he resolves
his sexual identity and preferences, because genetic fate set the stage for his tragic
predicament, his unexpected "sex change." Cal's immature body betrayed him-in a
way that seems to differentiate him from transsexuals who change from one sex to
another.297 Given the transformation he was biologically destined to endure, how could
even the most stubborn reader deny Callie or Cal the opportunity to live a full life and
to love another human being, whatever that person's sex or gender?
Yet, casting the problem this way relies on a biological model that portrays Cal and
other intersexed individuals as the hapless victims of a condition or abnormality over
which they have no control. According to this perspective, intersexed victims must
make the best of their unfortunate situation, just like others with disabilities. Although
this biological model might offer some legal advantages, victimhood carries
accompanying disadvantages, as analyses of various strategies to advance gay rights
292. See supra notes 106-08, 117-18, and accompanying text (summarizing DREGER,
supra note 30); see also FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 112 (theorizing that debates about
"intersexuality are inextricable from those over homosexuality").
293. That Cal had to defy, to disappoint, and to abandon temporarily his family, as well
as to assume an entirely new identity, in order to choose this path of privilege shows how much
it was worth to him. There were other possibilities open to Callie. For examples of the
renunciation of privilege in the context of racial hierarchy, see supra note 94.
294. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (referring to queer theorists' resistance
to such categories); see also Valdes, supra note 11, 265-66 (examining "penalization of gender
atypicality/transitivity").
295. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
297. Sharon Preves reports that some intersexed individuals seek to maintain their
difference from transsexuals in order to avoid criticism and blame. See PREvES, supra note 4, at
114 ("Realizing that they could be assessed more blame for changing genders if they were
mistakenly thought to be typical men or women undergoing sex reassignment, several
[intersexed individuals who rejected the assignment given to them] maintained the import of
distinguishing intersexuality from transsexuality."). But see KESSLER, supra note 24, at 122
(rejecting notion that locating difference in biology will address discrimination).
2005]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
have explored. 29 8 A competing approach emphasizes desire rather than destiny, seeking
to ground respect for the conduct of sexual minorities in autonomy. Although some
saw promise for gay rights in equal protection arguments invoking biology, 299 the
Supreme Court's recent majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas unmistakably rests on
liberty and choice, 300 not immutable characteristics. Middlesex gives us some of both:
biology brings Cal to an extraordinary crossroads, but he chooses his own sexual
future.3'
IV. THE ROAD AHEAD: THREE THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS
With the insights that Cal's experience provides, we can imagine three different
paths subsequent legal developments might follow. Consider these brief thought
experiments that highlight the inordinate importance our culture has attached to
gender-not fully developed proposals we are likely to see implemented anytime soon.
First, the law might adopt a multifactored approach to sex and gender. The Heilig
court and the appellate court in Gardiner undertook this approach, relying on medical
authorities and the legal analysis of Julie Greenberg. This approach necessarily means
that not everyone will neatly fit either a "male" or "female" category, and legal
decisionmakers will look to medical evidence to resolve questions of gender when
some factors conflict or reveal ambiguity.
A second, and more far-reaching, approach would rest exclusively on individual
autonomy. 302 Judicial reliance on liberty in both Lawrence and Goodridge gives force
to this approach. Perhaps gender categories would be less problematic if they were
open equally to all. Suppose each individual had the opportunity to choose a gender,
with all of the social roles, performances, expectations, and norms that the given
gender entails. Similarly, if a same-sex couple wished to marry, then one would elect
298. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of
the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503 (1994). Relying on "vicitimization" to
gain legal advantages has been critiqued in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin,
Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1994) (examining problems in the use of battered women's
syndrome as a defense for women who kill their batterers). But see BUTLER, supra note 32, at
75-76.
299. See, e.g., Symposium, Queer Law 1999: Current Issues in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
and Transgendered Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 279,348-64 (1999) (addressing, inter alia, "Is
Sexual Orientation Immutable? Presenting Scientific Evidence in Litigation to Gain Strict
Scrutiny"); see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,68-70 (Haw. 1993) (Bums, J., concurring)
(considering the impact of evidence that sexual orientation is "biologically fated" in challenge to
male-female requirement for marriage).
300. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-76.
301. Autonomy, empowerment, and "coming out" have emerged as important features
of recent activism designed to change the secrecy, shame, and medical treatment traditionally
associated with intersex. See, e.g., DREGER, supra note 30, at 170-97; KESSLER, supra note 24,
at 80; PREVES, supra note 4, at 61-62, 135.
302. Surveying the reported cases, Greenberg concludes that "the vast majority... have
rejected self-identification as the critical sex determinant." Greenberg, supra note 109, at 294.
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an assignment as "husband" and the other as "wife." 30 3 One might invoke religion as an
analogy. Religion is often an important part of one's life and identity,304 but we give
adults the freedom to choose a particular faith (or none at all). True, children often
begin life in a particular religion chosen by their parents, but they become free to make
a different choice when they mature.
This is precisely the approach to gender and sex that reformers of the medical
treatment of intersexed children have proposed: parents should provisionally select a
gender for rearing an intersexed child, but they should refuse consent for surgery until
the child can participate in the decision. 30 5 The key ideas are that only the individual
can know his or her preferred gender identity and that surgery can irreparably interfere
with the choice the individual will eventually want to make. Cal illustrates how one
might choose a gender different from that of childhood rearing.
306
Although the intersex reformers and Cal's story address choice for those who at
least appear sexually ambiguous, why not allow everyone to choose? Most people, no
doubt, will select the gender of their rearing, but some will prefer to "change" genders,
with or without surgery. Why not defer to such individual selections, instead of
insisting upon medical evidence about anatomy, "an irreversible and permanent
change" through surgery, chromosomes, or even dysphoria, as Heilig and the appellate
court in Gardiner require?
30 7
Can we push further and use Cal's story to imagine a third and even more
provocative avenue for reform? Why not "abolish" gender 30 -or at least let go of its
303. Cf Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals. From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodem
Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1479 (2001) (proposing alternative models of marriage for
couples to choose).
304. For a related but different parallel between gender and religion, see DAvID L. KiRP
ET AL., GENDER JUSTICE 120-23 (1986). The authors read the Supreme Court's cases in both
areas to have similar aims: "to protect free exercise, whether of religion or life choices; and to
proscribe governmental imposition of conventions, establishments of religion, or sex-role
stereotypes." Id. at 120-21. More recently, David Cruz has called for the deinstitutionalization
of gender, based on the parallels he develops to the First Amendment's religion clauses. See
Cruz, supra note 159.
305. See, e.g., FAUSTO-STERLNG, supra note 11, at 79-80; Kipnis & Diamond, supra
note 69; Reiner & Gearhart, supra note 69.
306. See EUGENIDES, supra note 1, at 479. This approach seems to capture Katherine
Franke's argument for "an underlying fundamental right to determine gender independent of
biological sex." Franke, supra note 103, at 99. Mary Anne Case makes a similar argument. See
generally Case, supra note 103. Note that the argument assumes the existence of separate and
identifiable gender categories.
307. See also KESSLER, supra note 24, at 121 (reporting the guiding principle of
transgender movement is to allow freedom to change sex and gender, whether temporarily or
permanently).
308. See BUTLER, supra note 32, at 81 ("gender as a mode of becoming"); id. at 144
(questioning binary categories); FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 101 (suggesting that we
multiply the number of recognized genders, but that doing so might ultimately make gender
irrelevant); id. at 110 (preferring "to dispense with claims to a separate intersexual identity");
KESSLER, supra note 24, at 90 (questioning activists' promotion of intersexuality as a new
identity); id. at 128 (suggesting "genital reconceptualization"); id. at 130 (suggesting we talk
"differently about intersexuality ... [by] not seeing it"); PREVES, supra note 4, at 154 (urging
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extraordinary significance? Imagine a world in which everyone had the "stereoscopic"
vision that Cal claims-and in which Callie's decision to become Cal was not worth
the trouble or, perhaps, was unintelligible.309 Imagine a world in which chromosomes
or genital anatomy or sexual orientation were as irrelevant to one's place in society as
Thurgood Marshall, arguing Brown v. Board of Education,3 10 suggested that eye color
was (and race should be). 3 " What would marriage look like in this world? Could we
conceptualize marriage as the Goodridge majority defines it: "the voluntary union of
two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others"? 312 Could this be where the
Supreme Court's anti-stereotyping analysis and popular culture's dissemination of
transgender tales will eventually take us, eliminating the rigid categories that now go
hand-in-hand with the subordination of women and sexual minorities? 313 How can we
acknowledge and respect differences without perpetuating hierarchies and disparities in
power? How can the law help achieve such goals? ,
For answers to these questions, we must await new chapters in the saga of sex and
gender and their evolving roles in life and law-just as when enjoying a good novel
one looks forward with curiosity and excitement to learn how the story will end. One
thing is clear already, however: popular culture both reflects and reinforces a
significant turning point in the plot, with more developments sure to follow. Read on.
that "[wle must remove or reduce the importance of gender categorization and the need for
gender categories, including the category of intersex itself"); see also Dalton, supra note 195, at
266 ("the goal of gender neutrality is ultimately unachievable so long as the courts remain
incapable of imagining a gender-free subject"). But see Case. supra note 103, at 75 (rejecting
abolition of gender as a normative goal).
309. Cf., e.g., Halley, supra note 93, at 82, 94-96; Valdes, supra note 11, at 265-66.
Even popular culture has begun to consider this possibility. See, e.g., Anna Quindlen, Outside
the Bright Lines, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11, 2003, at 64 (commenting on Boylan's book, supra note
82); Jacqueline White, Where No Woman (or Man) Has Gone Before: News from the Frontiers
of Gender, UTNE READER, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 32, 34 (noting the response to "transpeople" on
college campuses, including gender-blind dormitory at Wesleyan University).
310. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
311. See ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55, at 44 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969). Of course,
reducing the importance of gender in the social and legal hierarchy might permit some
temporary consideration of gender for the traditionally subordinated group-just as we have
learned to accept with respect to race. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Indeed,
Marshall's oral argument noted that we have not subordinated "blue-eyed people" with "the
badge of slavery." ARGUMENT, supra, at 44.
Kessler suggests a different analogy: "Treating genital formations as innate but
malleable, much like hair, would be to take them and gender less seriously." KESSLER, supra
note 24, at 132.
312. 798 N.E.2d at 969 (presenting a "reformulation" of "civil marriage").
313. See also KESSLER, supra note 24, at 124 ("If gendered bodies fall into disarray,
sexual orientation will follow.").
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